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PANEL ON FEDERALISM IN PRACTICE­
NATIONAL AND LOCAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
STATES' USE OF CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE 
UNDOCUMENTED OR UNAUTHORIZED 
MIGRATION* 
In November 2010, the Journal hosted a panel on Federalism in 
Practice as part of its Fall Symposium. Below is a transcript of the 
discussion which took place at Loyola University New Orleans College 
of Law. This transcript consists of the speakers' remarks along with 
audience participation and questions. The Journal has attempted to 
preserve the character and substance of the discussion. While this is 
not a traditional Article, the Journal felt that it would be fitting to 
include in our Spring volume. 
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR]: This panel is 
going to take a slightly different approach to the same issue discussed in the 
first panel, namely the intersection of state criminal law and immigration 
law. Instead of presenting prepared papers, we have three fantastic experts 
on this panel and we've asked each of them to r eflect for five to ten minutes 
on the intersection of state criminal law and immigration law from their 
unique perspectives and then we'll begin our roundtable discussion. After 
that point, we'll also be looking to you, the audience, for questions. 
First, let me introduce each of the panelists. Professor Diamond is 
currently the Jules F. and Frances L. Landry Distinguished Professor of 
Law at Louisiana State University Law Center. Prior that appointment he 
was a professor at Tulane University Law School here in New Orleans, 
where he held the John Koerner Professorship in Law, and was previously 
the C.J. Morrow Research Professor of Law, and was an Adjunct Professor 
for African Diaspora Studies. His expertise is widely known and his 
scholarship has touched on a variety of these issues. What may be 
interesting for some of you is that his scholarship most recently has looked 
* In an effort to preserve the unique character of the panel, the editors have reprinted the text of 
the speakers' remarks essentially as delivered. To assist the reader in understanding the text, 
however, the editors and speakers have provided references to authorities that are central to the 
debate. 
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at the Second Amendment and he has been cited by the Supreme Court in 
its recent Second Amendment jurisprudence. 
Next, we will hear from Professor Eagly, who is an Acting Professor 
of Law at University of California, Los Angeles Law School. She teaches 
Evidence and the Criminal Defense Clinic. She has an amazing public 
interest background, working on criminal defense issues and immigration 
issues, including receiving a Skadden Fellowship to work on immigrant 
worker rights issues at the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago and a 
Soros Criminal Justice Fellowship to direct a domestic violence program. 
Her scholarship has also appeared widely in the UCLA Law Review, the 
Clinical Law Review, and the Northwestern University Law Review. 
The last member of our expert panel is Professor Hiroko Kusuda, and 
she is one of our golden own here at Loyola University of New Orleans. 
Professor Kusada is a Clinical Professor of Immigration Law, assisting 
student attorneys to gain essential skills in representing immigrants before 
the Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, as well as in 
the federal courts. She is also a Staff Attorney with the Catholic Legal 
Immigration Network, which is a subsidiary of ·the U.S. Conference of 
Catholic Bishops. She coordinates, in that capacity, a state-wide detention 
project which includes direct representation of detained immigrants, as well 
as presentations on legal rights of immigrants. She's is a member of the 
Executive Board for the American Immigration Lawyers Association and is 
a frequent guest speaker on the pressing issues of immigration. 
We'll hear from each of the experts in the order they were introduced 
and then begin our discussion. Professor Diamond? 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: Well, thank you very much, 
and I hope my time doesn't begin right away, because I need to say "thank 
you" first, to the Journal for having this symposium; secondly, to Professor 
Medina for inviting me; and, thirdly, to all of you for welcoming me back 
someplace where I feel at home. You may know that I have taught here at 
Loyola as an adjunct on a couple of occasions, but what I know you don't 
know is that when I studied for the bar exam way back in the last 
millennium, it was in Loyola's library that I studied, so I always feel very at 
home when I come back to Loyola. 
What I want to talk about today is in perhaps equal parts fi t b t · 1 ·d · , irs a ou practica cons1 erattons, but secondly about theory There · · 1 . . . . 1s a practlca cons1�erat10n he�e with respect to the police enforcement of SB I 070. It unav01dably subjects persons lawfully in the country to police stops. 1 It is 
I. See ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 11-1051(8) (2010) ("Fo I f I · r any aw u stop, detention or arrest made 
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undoubtedly true that police stop people all the time. So the question is: 
What is different about this particular burden, that when a person is 
lawfully stopped and police have a reasonable suspicion that a person is not 
in the country legally, that they should investigate that suspicion? What is 
different is that such persons must be prepared to prove their status, and/or 
to be arrested when they cannot do so, and that this burden will l ikely fall 
on a class of individuals in the main, and almost exclusively, to be 
distinguished by race and national origin. 2 
This burden is racial. Police will make their determinations as to 
reasonable suspicion on the basis of appearance, on the basis of accent. 
They are making a determination of reasonable suspicion on the basis of 
national origin, something that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
considered to be coincident with race. 3 So it seems to me that this burden is 
not only racial, it is an invidious piece of  racial discrimination, and the 
question that we have is whether the state can undertake this investigation 
and these arrests consistent with a compelling interest. SB 1070 maintains 
that the state has a compelling interest "in the cooperative enforcement of 
federal immigration laws throughout all of  Arizona."4 As I will relate 
by a law enforcement official or a law enforcement agency of this state or a law enforcement 
official or a law enforcement agency of a county, city, town or other political subdivision of this 
state in the enforcement of any other law or ordinance of a county, city or town or this state where 
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United 
States, a reasonable attempt shall be made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status 
of the person, except if the determination may hinder or obstruct an investigation. Any person who 
is arrested shall have the person's immigration status determined before the person is released." 
(emphasis added)). 
2. See, e.g., Alicia E. Barron, Truck Driver Forced to Show Birth Certificate Claims Racial­
profiling, AZ.FAMILY.COM, Apr. 21 , 2010 , http://www.azfamily.com/news/91769419.html 
(television news account of an Hispanic man stopped days before Arizona's governor signed 
SBI070 into law, arrested, transported to immigration authorities, and forced to provide a birth 
certificate before being released). As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Brignoni­
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), the "single factor [of] apparent Mexican ancestry," as was apparently 
the case in this incident, "would [not] justify . . .  a reasonable belief of' of alienage. Id at 885-86. 
Large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics 
identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area a relatively small proportion of 
them arc aliens. The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high 
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it docs not justify 
stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask ifthcy arc aliens. 
Id. at 866-87 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
3. See e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (discussing the Fourteenth 
Amendment "[t]hese provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the 
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws"). 
4. 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 113 ("The legislature finds that there is a compelling interest in the 
cooperative enforcement of federal immigration laws throughout all of Arizona. The legislature 
declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all 
state and local government agencies in Arizona. The provisions of this act are intended to work 
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shortly, I question, however, whether that is a compelling interest. 
Presuming that the interest is compelling, the means chosen to 
effectuate the interest must be narrowly tailored, and this means is not 
narrowly tailored.5 Effectively, this is a race specific means, and in fact, 
there are race neutral means of carrying out this interest. Such means 
would be very burdensome on police and indeed, very burdensome on 
every person in the state- if, for example, every person whether citizen or 
non-citizen irrespective of race or national origin were subject to citizenship 
examination.6 Yet, this would be a burden shared across racial lines. And 
because of the nature of the burden as one shared by all, it is entirely 
possible that Arizona's legislature would not undertake to impose this 
burden. Instead, what we have is the state imposing the burden of what it 
presumes is good governmental policy on Hispanics, a racially identifiable 
minority and a very fine example of what Carolene Products denominated 
as "discrete and insular minorities."7 As a practical consideration, then, I 
don't think that this particular portion of the statute can be maintained 
because, as a practical matter, it will involve invidious racial discrimination 
that cannot be justified. 
Now what I want to do, as well, and this gets into theory, is to 
question whether it is any interest at all of the state to attend to the 
enforcement of federal law respecting the presence or movement of any 
person, whether citizen or alien, legal or not into the state from outside the 
nation. I want to question whether it's any business of the states at all, not 
simply whether the state has a compelling interest but whether the state has 
any interest at all. 
The best case for Arizona that it has the power to attend to 
immigration, to attend to movement of non-citizens in the state of Arizona, 
can be made in Article 1, Section 9, in what we refer to as the 1808 Clause.8 
The 1808 Clause provided that Congress would have no power until 1808 
to prevent "[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the 
together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity 
by persons unlawfully present in the United States."). 
5. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (noting that racial 
classifications "are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further 
compelling governmental interests"). 
�· This is not to say that such police stops and inquiries would comport with 4th Amendment 
requirements . 
7. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
8. U.S. C
.
ONST. art. I, § 9, cl. I ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the 
S
.
tates now cx1st111g sh�ll think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress p1ior to the 
'tear one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such 
lmportat1on, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person."). 
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States now existing shall think proper to admit."9 At its very first 
opportunity, Confless did undertake to end the African-slave trade effective 
January 1, 1808. Before January 1, 1808, all of the states regulated the 
immigration of persons into the United States, and particularly with respect 
II 
to slaves. Many of the states, from Massachusetts all the way down to 
Georgia, either allowed or, in most cases, disallowed the importation of 
Africans into the United States.12 North Carolina and Georgia, at one point, 
9. Id. 
1 0. ANNALS OF CONG. 1 806-1 807, 1 266-1 270. 
l l. See W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SUPPRESSION OF THE AFRICAN SLAVE TRADE 230-43 ( 1 896). 
1 2. Several states, primarily in the North, banned the slave trade at early points after the 
Constitution was proposed, and even before it was ratified by the necessary nine states. See Act of 
Feb. 22, 1788, ch. 40, 1 788 N.Y. Laws (an act concerning slaves); Act of Apr. 4, 1 80 1 ,  1 80 1  N.Y. 
Laws (banning the import and export of slaves except for person previously owning slaves 
undertaking a bona fide relocation to the state); Act of Mar. 25, 1 788, ch. 1 1 , 1 788 Mass. Acts 
(Massachusetts bans slave trade); Act of Mar. 29, 1 788, ch. CXLIX, § 2, 1 788 Pa. Laws 
(Pennsylvania manumits all slaves brought to the state by any resident or person intending 
pennanent residence). Similarly, Connecticut banned the involvement of its residents in the slave 
trade on October 9, 1 788, just months after the Constitution was ratified. See Act of Oct. 8, 1788, 
1 788 Conn. Pub. Acts 368 (an act to prevent the slave trade), amended by 1792 Conn. Pub. Acts 
41 2 (Connecticut strengthens penalties associated with the 1 788 act). 
At about this point, South Carolina would embark upon a series of temporary bans on 
importation of slaves that the state would continue to renew until it made the ban permanent in 
1 803. See Act of Nov. 4, 1 788,  1 788 S.C. Acts (banning importation of non-domestic slaves until 
1 793); Act of Dec. 2 1 ,  1 792,  1 792 S.C. Acts (extended the 1 788 ban until 1 795); Act of Dec. 20, 
1794, 1 794 S.C. Acts (extended the ban until 1 797); Act of Dec. 19, 1 796, 1 796 S.C. Acts 
(extended ban until 1 799). The ban on importation of slaves lapsed for a period of almost two 
years until it was revived and extended. See Act of Dec. 20, 1 800, 1 800 S.C. Acts (reviving the 
ban and extending it to 1 803). It was extended not only to all slaves of both foreign and domestic 
source, but also to free persons of African descent. See Act of Dec. 20, 1 800, S.C. Acts (excepting 
migrants with no more than ten slaves); see also Act of Dec. 1 9, 1 80 1 ,  1 80 1  S.C. Acts (made 
criminal penalties more stringent). But see Act of Dec. 18, 1 8 02, 1 802 S.C. Acts (provided that 
the limitations on importation did not apply to citizens of other states in transit with slave property 
to a third state). Finally in 1 803, the ban was made permanent. Act of Dec. 3, 1 803, 1803 S.C. 
Acts (limited and made permanent the prohibition on slave importation to those originating in the 
West Indies and South America, and limited the ban on importation of domestic slaves to those 
without certificates of good character). 
Less extreme than South Carolina, its immediate neighbor to the north would ban for one year 
the import of slaves and indentured servants of African ancestry. See 1 794 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. II 
(prevented the further importation and bringing of slaves and indented servants of colour into the 
state). The state would limit the ban the following year, however. See 1 795 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 
XVI (North Carolina bans importation of slaves from the West Indies as well as the Windward 
and Leeward Islands). By contrast, Georgia moved in 1 793 to bans importation of slaves from the 
West Indies, the Windward and Leeward Islands, and Florida. See Act of Dec. 1 9, 1 793, 1 793 Ga. 
Laws. The state extended the ban to all slaves five years later, with exceptions for persons 
migrating to Georgia and for Georgians inheriting slaves from elsewhere. Act of Jan. 3 1 , 1 798, 
1798 Ga. Laws. By virtue of a provision in a new constitution ratified later that year, the ban on 
importation of foreign slaves was made permanent. GA. CONST., art. IV,§ 1 1 . 
Other states would act with finality. See 1 796 Md. Laws ch. LXVII, § I (Maryland bans slave 
importation, with exceptions for migrants from other states); Act of Mar. 1 4, 1 798, ch. 
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allowed the import�tion of Africans, but not West Indians or other slaves 
from the New World.13 This was after slave revolts that became the Haitian 
revolution. Again, the states, all of them, regulated immigration in the 
United States. 
The states regulated the movement across state lines not only of slaves 
but also of free blacks. 14 It is interesting that in 1860, Indiana, Illinois, and 
Oregon all had limitations on movement of free black people across state 
lines, 15 and only in that year did Iowa end its restriction on black 
immigration.16 The Illinois Constitution of 1848 directed the legislature to 
pass laws ;rohibiting importation of slav
es as well as the migration of free 
Negroes,' and in 1853 the legislature responded to that command.18 The 
Indiana Constitution of 1851 had provided that "[n]o negro or mulatto shall 
come into, or settle in the State, after the adoption of this Constitution."1
9 
Oregon's 1859 Constitution forbade the entry of all Negroes whether free or 
20 slave. 
Thirty years earlier in 1830, Indiana, Illinois, and Ohio had mandated 
bonds for good behavior of all free Negroes.21 New Jersey, a northern state, 
was among slave states in the early 1800s, and there were limitations on 
DCCXXVII,§ 12, 1798 N.J. Laws (New Jersey bans slave importation). 
This is not to say that during this period the only immigration concerns the states had respected 
slavery and race. Connecticut and South Carolina, for example, also passed laws banning the 
transportation of convicts into their jurisdictions. See 1788 Conn. Pub. Acts 367 (an act to prevent 
the importation of convicts); Act of Nov. 4, 1788, 1788 S.C. Acts (an act for preventing the 
transportation of convicted malefactors from foreign countries into this state). 
13. See id 
14. Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the 
Antebellum North, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 415-82 (1986). 
15. Act of F.eb. 12, 1853 (forbidding migration of free Negroes into Illinois, providing for fines and expulstons for v10lation of the prohibition, and for sale at auction for those unable to pay 
fines); IND. CONST. of 1851, art. XIII (prohibiting all Negroes whether slave or free from entry); 
OR. C
_
ONST. of 1859, art. XVIII (prohibiting all Negroes whether slave of free from entry). See 
also Fmkelman, supra note 14, at 439. 
16. See Finkelman, supra note 14, at 432. 
17. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XIV. 
18.
_ 
Act of �eb. _ 12, 1853 (forbidding migration of free Negroes, providing for fines and expulsions for vtolation of the prohibition, and for sale at auction for those unable to pay fines). 
19. IND. CONST. of 1851, art. Xlll. 
20. OR. CONST. of 1859, art. XVIII. 
21. Act of Jan 17 1829 1829 Ill R L · ' ' · ev. aws I st Spec. Sess. 1-4· Act of Feb I 1831 1833 Ind. Rev. Laws l ·  Act of Jan 25 1807 oh· G A 
' 
· · ' 
1849 Ohio Laws ,17-18· A; f A 13 /o en. ssem. Laws 1-5, repealed by Act of Feb. IOI. 










1827 Mich. �ev. Laws l st & 2nd Councils 1-10, 
repealed in 1933. 1833-34 Mich Laws 12 
ic . rd leg. Council lst sess. 1-2. The amendment was 
also Finkelman, supra note 14, �t 434. 
58, and the underlymg statute was repealed in 1837. See 
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movement of blacks into New Jersey, as well as other slave states.22 
This freedom to regulate immigration into their territory is what that 
the states lost, in my estimate, with the Fourteenth Amendment.23 The 
Dred Scott case infamously said to us that "[Negroes) had no rights which 
the white man was bound to rcspect,"24 but it also was the first judicial 
determination of the limits of citizenship,25 and Chief Justice Taney's 
opinion in the case determined that people of African descent were not 
contemplated by the framers as citizens, and that while the states could 
recognize state citizenship, Negroes were permanently barred from 
citizenship status.26 Now the Fourteenth Amendment defines citizenship, 
22. Finkelman, supra note 14, at 434. 
23. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
im munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."). 
24. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856). 
25. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 53 
(2006). 
26. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393. "In effect, Chief Justice Taney maintained that blacks, regardless 
of their status as free or slave, were mere inhabitants of the United States, never to be citizens, id. 
at 418-19, even if a state independently granted them citizenship, id. at 405-06. In reaching his 
conclusion, Chief Justice Taney gave emphasis to the mass of discriminatory state legislation and 
constitutional law limiting the rights of free blacks. Id. at 412-16. See also L. LITWACK, NORTH 
OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STA TES, 1790-1860 (I 961 ). Chief Justice Taney ignored 
or otherwise deliberately dismissed a body of politically and physically liberating legislative and 
constitutional law that both free and slave states had adopted in the wake of the American 
Revolution-law that had cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the point that the Chief Justice was 
making. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 564, 572-76 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also 
Diamond & Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial Classification Scheme and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 29 LOY. L. REV. 255, 260-62 (1983). The citizenship vel non of free 
blacks under the 1787 Constitution as unamended is not the subject and is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Yet, it must be pointed out that Chief Justice Taney's opinion regarding the citizenship of 
blacks was not shared by a majority of the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Taney's opinion was 
styled 'the opinion of the court,' Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399, but it was joined in full 
only by Justice Wayne, who saw fit to write his own opinion nonetheless. Id. at 454. Justice 
Daniel wrote his own opinion and did not join at all in the Taney opinion, but agreed with the 
Chief Justice on a point for point basis. Id at 469. Four Justices, Grier, Nelson, Campbell, and 
Catron, agreed with the result as announced by Chief Justice Taney, but did not reach the issue of 
citizenship. Id. at 457 (Nelson, J., concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring); id. at 494 
(Campbell, J. concurring); id. at 519 (Catron, J., concurring). Two Justices, McLean and Curtis, 
dissented with respect to both the result and the issue of citizenship. Id. at 529 (McLean, J., 
dissenting); id. at 564 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Thus, only three members of the Court had declared 
that blacks were outside the Constitution because of their race, and two members had dissented 
vigorously. This alignment hardly constituted a finn national consensus on this issue." Raymond 
T. Diamond, No call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis on the Intent of a Pro-Slavery 
Constitution, 42 V AND. L. REV. 93, n.108 (1989). 
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by its very terms-a person is a citizen who was born in the United States 
or who is naturalized, and is a citizen of the state in which that person 
resides as well.27 Under the terms of the 14th Amendment, the rights and 
privileges of citizens of the United States are protected,28 and one of those 
privileges is movement across state lines, protected if not under the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment, then by that 
Amendment's Due Process Clause.29 I would make the argument that if it 
is so, then the power states exercised before the Fourteenth Amendment to 
regulate immigration and movement of noncitizens into their territory, was 
lost by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
A question raised for practitioners of the political arts is whether 
Congress will exercise its power under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment3° 
to explicitly override efforts like those in Arizona and what has been 
proposed here in Louisiana.31 The further question is whether there will be 
congressional efforts to empower the states to u ndertake laws like this-a 
constitutionally questionable undertaking32-or whether Congress will 
simply leave the issue to the courts by standing silent. 
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR]: Thank you very 
much Professor Diamond. Professor Eagly? 
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I want to start out by thanking Loyola 
University New Orleans College of Law, Professor Isabel Medina, and the 
Journal of Public Interest Law for inviting me to participate in this 
conversation today. It is wonderful to be a part of this symposium which 
addresses the critical intersection between immigration law and criminal 
law. Because this area of law is so rapidly changing, it is particularly 
important to address the policy issues that are at stake. 
27. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. See also United States v. Wo1w Kim Ark. 169 U.S. 649. 
702-03 (1898). e 
· 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I. 
29. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502-05 (1999); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160. 178-80 ( 1948). The holding in these two cases are certainly consistent with dicta in The Slaughterhouse 
Cases, 83 U.�. 36 (1872), t� the 
.
�ffe�t that privileges and immunities protected by the 14th 
Am�ndment mclude those nghts which owe their existence to the Federal government its National character, its Constitution, or its laws." Id. at 79. 
' 
. 30. _ "T�� Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5. 
31. See H.B. 1205, Reg. Sess. (La. 2010). 
32. Congress has n� power to authorize states to violate the Constitution. "Certainly all those who have framed wntten constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law �f the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." Marbury v. Madison 5 u S 
'
137 177(1803). , . . , 
2011] Panel on Federalism in Practice 383 
Immigration crime is now the most prosecuted crime in our federal 
criminal justice system. It is not just the most prosecuted crime, but it 
actually constitutes over half of the federal criminal docket.33 Noncitizens 
are now 40% of all defendants being sentenced under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines. 34 If we were to add in those who were sentenced to 
petty crimes and magistrate courts, the percentage of noncitizen defendants 
would be even higher. 35 
As the panelists this morning have already begun to document, for 
some time we have not just been seeing the increased criminalization of 
migration in the federal system, but we have also been seeing similar shifts 
at the state level. Arizona's Senate Bill 1070,36 which was talked about 
earlier today, is being hotly contested in the courts and we do not 
necessarily know how that litigation will ultimately be resolved.37 SB 1070 
is by far the most common example of this criminalization trend and the 
one that has received the most media attention. 
If SB 1070 were ever fully implemented in the courts, it would do a 
number of things. Essentially, it would grant local law enforcement officers 
broader authority to stop individuals to ask questions regarding immigration 
status and make arrests for violations o f  the immigration law. 38 It would 
also create certain new crimes-such as failing to carry alien registration 
papers and working without authorization to be legally present in the United 
States.39 The explicit p urpose of the law is to enforce immigration: to 
borrow the language of the statute itself, "to make attrition through 
enforcement the public p olicy of all state and local government agencies in 
Arizona."40 But, SB 1070 is only one such law and there are a number of 
other laws that were passed previously in Arizona and in other states. In 
addition, a number of "copy cat" bills have been proposed or adopted in the 
wake of SB 1070. 
As we launch into our panel discussion, I want to provide a brief 
33. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1281-82 (2010). 
34. Id. at 1282 n.5. 
35. Id. at 1288. 
36. 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070, amended by H.B. 2162, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 
2010). 
37. See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (preliminarily 
enjoining enforcement of many provisions of SB l 070). The district court decision is currently on 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit. See United States v. Arizona, No. 10-16645, 2010 WL 5162508 (9th 
Cir. 2010). 
38. See, e.g., Sec. 2(B), amending ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 11-1051(8) (2010). 
39. Sec. 3, adding ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 {2010); Sec. 5, adding ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-2928(C) (2010). 
40. S.8. 1070, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. § l (Ariz. 2010). 
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conceptual sketch of what these emerging state laws contain so that we can 
start to understand in more detail how they are actually being used to 
enforce migration. Broadly speaking, these laws can be broken down into 
three general categories: substantive criminal laws, procedural court rules, 
and laws and policies that affect law enforcement authority. 
In regard to the first category, we have state laws that actually 
criminalize alienage-related offenses or conduct that we associate with 
immigration. A number of states have passed laws that actually require 
proof of alienage as an element in a crime. They include crimes such as 
alien gun possession, driving while undocumented, working while 
undocumented, and various document-related fraud crimes, such as using 
false documents to conceal one's alien status.41 A number of states have 
also adopted smuggling, trafficking, or harboring crimes, some of which 
require proof of alienage as an element.42 
We are also seeing a wider use of state and local criminal laws that 
have been on the books for a long time to target acts that are perceived to be 
associated with illegal migration. For example, laws criminalizing driving 
without legal permission can, in practice, be used to prosecute those who 
lack a driver's license as a result of their immigration status.43 
With regard to the second category, we are seeing an expansion of 
state procedural rules that treat noncitizen defendants differently from 
citizens. Some of these rules can be described as curtailing rights. 
Consider, for example, laws that create a presumption against granting of 
bond to those perceived to be undocumented.44 Other rules require judges, 
41. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 114 (West Supp. 2010) (making it a felony punishable by 
fiv� years '.n prison or a fine of $25,000 to use false documents to conceal one's true citizenship or 
res1d�n� ahen status); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.360 (2006) (making it a felony for a person 
who ts 1llegally or unlawfully in the United States to possess a firearm); 18 P A. CONS. ST AT. ANN. 
§ 6 l 05(c)(S) (West 2000) (prohibiting aliens and persons illegally in the United States from 
possessing, using, or selling firearms). 
_
42: See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT.§ 18-13-128 (2009) (making it a felony to, "for the purpose of 
ass1stmg another person to enter, remain in, or travel through the United States or the state of 




for money or any other thing of value"); FLA. ST AT. ANN .  § 787.07 (West 
2007) (makmg 1t a misd�m�anor to "transport(] into this state an individual who the person 
knows,. 
or should know, ts illegally entering the United States from another country)· OKLA . 
ST�T. tit. 21 § �46 (Su�
,
P· 2010) (making it illegal to transport, conceal, or harbor aliens "knowing or m reckless d�sregard of the fact that they entered or remain in the United States illegally). 
43. See Juha Preston & Robert Gebeloff, Unlicensed Drivers Who Risk More Th F. N.Y.TIMES,Dec.10,2010, atAI . 
ana me, 
44. Arizona's new bond law is particularly restrictive. It mandates the detention without bond, of defendants charged with "serious felony offenses" who have "entered 
· 
' 
d · h U ·t d St t ·11 II ,, 
· 
or remame m t e me a es 1 ega y. Anz. Prop. 100 (2006) (HCR 2028) d. 
& ARIZ. REV. STAT ANN . 
'amen mg ARIZ. CONST. art. II,§ 22 
· 
· 
§ 13-3961 (2010), avatlable at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2006/ 
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corrections officers, and other law enforcement officers to investigate 
immigration status and make reports to federal authorities of people who 
are suspected of being deportablc.45 
The third category includes those state and local laws that generally 
expand the authority of local police and other law enforcement officers to 
investigate immigration-related offenses and to refer people to federal 
authorities. Essentially, these laws allow local police to engage in 
immigration screening as part of their routine police work on the ground. 
Some states have passed laws preventing localities from adopting policies 
that would limit the authority of officers to enforce immigration l aw while 
engaging in routine police enforcement activities.46 We are also 
increasingly seeing states engaging in cooperative agreements with the 
federal government. For example, under the so-called 287(g) program, 
local police officers and correctional officers screen for immigration status 
with the support of federal funding.47 
I think it is important to provide this brief sketch of the laws that 
support the criminal immigration enforcement scheme at the local level as a 
first step to understanding how these laws operate in practice. As compared 
to the federal criminal justice system, which is relatively standardized 
across the country, we know much less about state and local criminal justice 
systems. Therefore we know less about the defendants who are actually 
being charged under these new laws. We also know less about how these 
new procedural rules are actually being implemented in practice. Finally, 
we know less about what is happening to people who are arrested and then 
referred to immigration without fust being criminally prosecuted. 
Some of the laws that have been passed recently may ultimately be 
found to be preempted. However, others may remain viable. As a result, it 
is important as we move forward to begin to understand how these laws 
actually function in practice so that policymakers can more effectively 
info/pubpamphlet/english/Prop I 00.htm. 
45. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 29-29-103(2)(a)(I) (2009) (requiring that "[a] peace officer 
who has probable cause that an arrestee for a criminal offense is not legally present in the U nited 
States . . . report such arrestee to [ICE]"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A § 3043(1) (1988) 
(requiring officials at correctional facilities or private institutions supported by public funds to 
inquire into the nationality each person admitted there, and if it appears that the person is an alien, 
to notify ICE of the date and reason for admission, the length of confinement, the country of 
which the person is citizen, and the date the alien entered the United States); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 
577.680 (West Supp. 2010) (directing all state and local law enforcement agencies to verify with 
OHS the immigration status of all individuals charged with a crime and jailed). 
46. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § l l-105l(A) (2010) (prohibiting Arizona officials, 
agencies, and political subdivisions from limiting enforcement of federal immigration laws). 
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006). 
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evaluate their effects on criminal process. 
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MOD ERA TOR): Thank you very 
much, Professor Eagly. Professor Kusuda? 
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: Again, I would like to thank you, 
Professor Medina, and the Journal for allowing me to be on this wonderful 
panel. I would like to speak my perspective as an immigration attorney 
who represents people in court proceedings and before the administrative 
agencies and see that we already face criminalization of immigrants on a 
daily basis. I just wanted to reiterate the issue that other panelists have 
pointed out, which is a cost to the state to attempt such a vast undertaking in 
regulating the behavior of a noncitizen or alleged non-citizens. As you 
know, Arizona's SB 107048 is being litigated in courts, and so far, 
apparently, at the cost to the state of Arizona over $1,000,00049 and 
Governor Brewer apparently has set aside $500,000 more for future 
litigation purposes.so According to recent reports, the legislators of Utah, 
where recently a copy-cat bill was introduced, came down to Phoenix to 
investigate whether or not this proposed Utah bill would impact their own 
jurisdictions and the state in general, and they wanted to assess the 
economic impact of that bill.st And the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce 
gave them a devastating presentation basically saying that the total 
estimated cost will be over $90,000,000;s2 as a result, several conferences 
have been cancelled based upon the negative press. 
The other states have been proposing, and have attempted to pass 
similar bills. A similar bill was introduced in Louisiana in a last legislative 
session in spring. House Bill 1205 was i ntroduced by representative 
Harrison, titled "Louisiana Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 201 O," 
which is an 18-page bill.s3 Unfortunately, he's  not going to be here today to 
discuss this bill, but we actually went to a legislative session this past spring 
48. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. § I (Ariz. 20 I 0). 
49. Howard Fischer, Cost of Defending SB 1070 Tops $1 M, EAST VALLEY TRIBUNE, Oct. 27. 
2010, http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/arizona/immigration/article I ff68ba2-e243- l t df-bc3e-
OO I cc4c002e0.html. 
-
�0. Ginger Rough, Fun�
 Tied to SB 1070 Nears $500,000, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 9, 2010, 
�
��
 .//www.azcentral.com/anzonarepubhc/local/articles/20 I 0/07 /09/20 I 00709dcfensefund0709 .ht 
51. Nicole Gonzalez, Utah leaders Find Immigration law Could Impact Economy, DESERET NEWS, Se�t. 30, 2010, ht tp://www.deseretnews.com/article/700069718/Utah-leaders-fi d-: · a· -law-could-impact-economy.html. 
in 1mm1gra on 
AZ Si. Alicia E. Barron, Boycotts Over SB-1070 Could Cost Phoenix Up to $90 Million · AMl�Y.C
�M, May 11, 2010, http://www.azfamily.com/outbound-feeds/yahoo-news/Bo cotts� over-1mm1grat1on-law-could-cost-Phoenix-up-to-90-million-93489339.html. 
y 
53. H.B. 1205, !st Reg. Sess. (La. 2010). 
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and tried to discuss this bill with the representative. We were successful in 
persuading the judiciary committee to pull the bill because the cost 
implication was huge to the state of Louisiana. 
That said, I ' m  going to move onto the legislative attempt to introduce 
similar bills, and the second point I wanted to make is our public safety 
issue. The advocates of such bills are saying that immigrants ' behavior 
jeopardizes public safety of the citizens of the state. We encounter people 
in all kinds of situations, many of whom are crime victims such as domestic 
violence. These people are commonly afraid to call the police because of 
lack of immigration status. And, one of the cases that we had a couple of 
years ago was of a family of five, a mother was heavily beaten up and taken 
to an emergency room and the hospital actually called us. They had 
nowhere else to go, and they were afraid to go back to their house, and we 
eventually were able to rescue the entire family by filing a so-called 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act54 petition, which was 
ultimately successful and regularized their status, however, because of the 
fear they had, they could not go to the authorities seeking protection from 
the abuser; a U.S.  citizen. 
Another example we've encountered at the Loyola Law Clinic was a 
case of immigrant workers who were burglarized, some of whom were 
murdered in an attempt to rob them. They were the victims of a crime but 
because they were undocumented workers l iving in a trailer, they were held 
in a parish jail for over six months as material witnesses because the 
prosecutor didn't  want them to be deported by the federal authorities. So 
the witnesses were kept in jail and could not communicate with anyone 
else. Through different sources we were able to find them and represent 
them in immigration proceedings, and eventually we were able to help them 
obtain U visas which provides protection for victims of serious crimes. 55 
When you talk about public safety, when people are victimized but 
cannot come out to seek protection from law enforcement officials-it' s  a 
serious problem. W e  understand noncitizens do commit crimes, but they 
also become victims, and when they have no voice in the system, it is a 
serious problem for us and the community as a whole. 
54. See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 1 06-386, 1 1 4 
Stat. 1464 (2000). See also William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization 
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 1 1 0-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) ("TVPRA"). In addition to expanding 
protections for trafficking victims generally, the TVPRA made procedural and substantive 
changes to immigration legal relief for unaccompanied alien chi ldren. Specifically, Section 235 of 
the TVPRA increased many protections for unaccompanied alien children seeking relief from 
removal, including Special Immigrant Juvenile status and asylum. 
55. See U Visa for Immigrants who are Victims of Crimes, U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT 
(201 0), http://www.usimmigrationsupport.org/visa-u.html. 
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Also, there is another argument that advocates for states advance-the 
federal government is not doing its job, so we are going to do it for them. If 
you listened to the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit earlier this week 
concerning the U.S.  government's law suit against SB 1 070, you could hear 
that the lawyer for the Arizona governor was arguing that the federal 
government was not controlling illegal immigration behavior. He said 
something along the line of-Arizona is �ing to do the best it can, but the 
federal government is not doing the job.5 The judge, Carlos Bea, asked 
this lawyer, saying 
Is this your argument that a state can take a look at whether or not the 
federal government is enforcing its laws? And if the federal 
government is not enforcing its laws, it can enforce the laws for the 
federal government? For instance, if I don't  pay my income tax to the 
federal government, can California come along and sue me for not . . ?57 paymg my mcome tax . 
And the lawyer for the state didn't have an answer for that question. What 
the judge was asking was exactly what states are saying they want to do, 
can we do it if we feel the federal government is not doing its job of 
regulating immigration law? 
Arizona's argum ent that the federal government is not doing its job 
does not make sense because the U.S. government has deported the highest 
number of people in the fiscal year 2009-20 1 0 .58 Almost 400,00059 people 
have been deported from this country this past fiscal year.60 And a 
staggering 2.6 trillion dollars have been allocated to spend on deportation.61 
According to Director John Morton of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, it will cost the U.S. government sixty-five billion dollars to 
56. Watch Recording for Case: USA v. State of Arizona No. 10-16645£8, U.S. COURTS FOR THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT (2010), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view _subpage.php?pk vid=0000006 I I 7; 
see also United States v. Arizona, No. 10- 1 6645, 20 1 0  WL 5 1 62508 (9th Cir� 20 1 0). The case 
history and pleadings are available at http://www.ca9.uscotrrts.gov/content/view.php?pk _id=0000000470. 
57. Court Hears A rizona Immigration Law Appeal, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Nov. J ,  20 1 0, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?story Id= 1 30982809. 
58. Peter Slevin, Deportation of Illegal Immigrants Increases Under Obama Administration, WASH. POST, July 26, 20 1 0, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/20 1 0/07 /25/ AR20 10072501 790.html. 
59. id. 
60. Report: New Obama Budget Should Cut Spending on Failed Immigration Enforcement, DEPORTATION NATION, Feb, 1 1 , 201 1 ,  http://www.deportationnation.org/201 1 /02/report-new­obama-budget-should-cut-spend1ng-on-failed-immigration-enforcemcnt/. 
6
_
1 .  �oses Apsan, Ma�s Deportation Of illegal Immigrants Cost $2.6 trillion over ten years­��mtgratio� Refmm Solution'. J?URNAL.US, http://news.jomal.us/article-47 1 6.Mass-Deportation-Of-1 egal-Imm1grants-Cost-26-tnll10n-over-ten-years-Immigration-Reform-Solution html (1 t . 't d Mar. t ,  201 1 ). · as v1s1 e 
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deport an estimated number of ten million undocumented people in this 
country.62 So think about it, Louisiana is suffering from budgetary cuts, for 
example, the costs of higher education are being seriously cut. Now we are 
going to have to drastically increase the state budget in helping the federal 
government to enforce federal law. It seems to me it doesn't  make any 
sense. Louisiana is a state that is known to have a very low number of 
foreign-born populations, but one of the highest number of immigration 
detainees in the country.63 We are known to be the highest receiving state 
of the country, that's  why we have four long-term immigration detention 
centers. 64 And it is a well known fact that 90% of the population of 
detainees is not represented by immigration lawyers. 
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR) : Thank you very 
much. Unfortunately, Representative Joe Harrison, who was slated to 
appear today, had to cancel. Representative Harrison has sponsored a bill 
here in Louisiana that may be relevant to our discussion. In his absence, I 
would like to provide a very brief summary of the bill and hear reactions 
from our expert panelists. 
The Louisiana proposed Act, House Bill  1 205, is an act, relative to 
immigration, to provide for the determination of citizenship status for 
persons charged with certain crimes. 65 The act provides for the notification 
to certain entities; it provides for the rebuttable presumption that c ertain 
persons are a flight risk; provides for establishing certain discriminatory 
practice; but also in one of the following clauses, provide for non­
discriminatory treatment. 66 Perhaps Professor Diamond can help us 
reconcile the interaction of those two separate provisions. 
The stated purposes of the act might also be relevant. The act is 
required, according to the proposed bill, because "it is a compelling public 
interest of this state to discourage illegal immigration by requiring all 
agencies within the state to fully cooperate with federal immigration 
authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws."67 Furthermore, 
[t]he state of Louisiana further finds that when illegal immigrants have 
been harbored and sheltered in this state and encouraged to reside in 
62. Ruben Navarrette, What is Immigration?, RED, BROWN, AND BLUE, Dec. I ,  2010, 
http://redbrownandblue.com/index.php/opinion-what-is-immigration. 
63. Hiroko Kusuda, et al., Hurricane Katrina: 5 Years later, CATH . LEGAL IMMIGR. 
NETWORK, INC., Aug. 27, 2010, http://cliniclegal.org/blog/ I 008/hurricane-katrina-5-years-later. 
64. The four detention centers are Oakdale Federal Detention Center, LaSalle Parish Detention 
Center, Tensas Parish Detention Center and South Louisiana Correctional Center. 
65. H.B. 1205, ! st Reg. Sess. (La. 20 1 0). 
66. Id. 
67. § 1 3 1 2. 
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this state through the issuance of identification cards that are issued 
without verifying immigration status, these practices impede and 
obstruct the enforcement of federal immigration law, underm ine the 
security of our borders, and impennissibly restrict the privileges and 
immunities of the citizens of Louisiana. 68 
There are also several subsections of the proposed law and one o f  the 
largest sub-sections addresses the public benefits provided by agencies o f  
the state. 69 This subsection requires that agencies verify the status o f  the 
people using those services and that affirmative proof of status may be 
required. Only a few exceRtions are listed, such as emergency room 
treatment and immunizations. 0 
How do you verify your immigration status? Well, in the bill it says 
that you fill out an affidavit, and it has to be notarized, and then that creates 
a rebuttable presumption.7 1  The state will stil l  send your information on for 
verification, but the affidavit appears to create a rebuttable presumption that 
you have legal authorization to be in the United States.72 In addition, the 
bill also creates an additional criminal penalty for the filing of a false or . ffid . 73 mcorrect a 1 av1t. 
There's a criminal section of the statute which would require police 
officers to determine at the time of booking the immigration status of the 
detainee.74 The police should make a "reasonable effort" to verify that the 
person has been lawfully admitted, and if they can't determine it at the time 
of booking, depending on the documents that the person may have with 
them, then the police must notify the Department of Homeland Security as 
soon as is practicable.75 Note, there is discretion built into the statute. 
A few additional sections of note. The proposed act contains a 
relatively low criminal standard-reckless d i sregard-for the crimes of 
unlawful assistance, unlawful harboring, and unlawful transportation of 
I .  76 h a 1ens. T e act also puts a lot of effort into making contractors de facto 
�nfo�cers. of the act, suc.
h that contr'\�tors are required to veri fy the 1mm1grat10n status of thelf employees.  Last, the act requires a state 
68. Id 
69. § 1 3 1 4. 
70. Id 
7 1 .  Id 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. § 1 3 1 5 . 
75. Id. 
76. § 1 3 17.  
77. § 1 3 1 9. 
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university student t o  prove their documented status in order t o  receive the 
preferential and lower resident tuition rate. 7x 
So those arc a few highlights of the p roposed bi l l  in Louisiana. I 
would love to get our experts' take on a few of the provisions. Maybe 
Professor Diamond, if you could start us off with discussion? 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: My first reaction is that 
Louisiana i s  running, in many respects, the same play as Arizona is, and 
one piece of the play is the exposition of a compelling interest in 
cooperation with the federal government with respect to federal 
immigration law.79 The doubt 1 would raise is that the state' s  interest is not 
as it argues it to be, cooperation with the federal government. Instead the 
state's apparent interest is to impose on the federal government state 
priorities respecting immigration. I would s uggest that this i s  not, by any 
stretch of the imagination, a compelling interest. It runs directly contrary to 
the idea that all of us understand who have ever read the case McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 80 that the U . S .  Constitution' s  Supremacy Clause 8 1  means that 
when a state policy runs contrary to a federal policy, when a state priority 
runs contra'iX to a federal law, it's the state policy or priority that falls to 
federal law. -
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I have a brief comment on the structure 
of the proposed Louisiana bill . 83 It is a comprehensive bil l  that includes 
both civil and criminal provisions. In many respects, the civil  provisions 
mirror California Proposition 1 87, which was passed by voters during the 
1990s.84 Essentially the Louisiana bill proposes that healthcare workers, 
educators, and other public employees be converted into enforcers of 
immigration laws. 85 The criminal provisions o f  the bill contain elements of 
all three types o f  laws that I discussed during my brief comments. In 
particular, it contains substantive immigration crimes, procedural rules for 
78. § 1 32 1 .  
79. See generally H.B. 1 205, ! st Reg. Sess. (La. 20 1 0). 
80. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. 3 1 6. 405-407 ( 1 8 1 9). 
8 1 .  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.  2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the 
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary 
notwithstanding."). 
82. McCulloch perhaps most famously held that "the states have no power . . . to retard, 
impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by 
[C)ongress . . . . " McCulloch, 1 7  U.S. at 436. 
83. H.B. 1 205, 1 st Reg. Sess. (La. 20 10). 
84. Cal. Prop. 1 87, 1 994 Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 1 87 (West). 
85. H.B. 1 205, 1 st Reg. Sess. §§ 1 3 14, 1 32 1 ,  1 3 1 9  (La. 20 1 0). 
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noncitizens, and expanded immigration law enforcement authority.86 
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: A criminal section of the Arizona bill 
basically mandates the detention of persons until law enforcement officers 
can determine the immigration status o f  that person. This section was 
troublesome to the Ninth Circuit panel. I kind of sense that they were 
concerned about how long a state authority can detain a person and at when 
point it raises a red flag. And the proposed Louisiana bill also says the 
peace officer "shall" attempt to notify the United States Department of 
Homeland Security as soon as practicable about the status of the citizen.87 
That should cause a big concern to us and everyone because it' s  a 
deprivation of liberty and freedom which is one of the constitutional rights 
that every citizen in this country enjoys. 
In practicality, the Department of Homeland Security can actually 
issue a detainer to any person who is arrested under the suspicion that the 
person is not in this country without lawful status.88 It' s  called an 
immigration detainer, but it expires after forty-eight hours of arrest, and 
after which the local sheriffs office has to make a determination whether or 
not the person' s  going to be released.89 If Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) doesn't come and take over the detainees' custody, the 
jail has to release him; otherwise they would be subject to a lawsuit called a 
writ of habeas corpus petition.90 So, this is area of the law that is going to 
be prone to a legal challenge if such law is  passed in this state, however, but 
Louisiana has been successful in passing a similar law in the past. 
I'd like to share a post-Katrina issue that immigrants faced in the 
metropolitan area of New Orleans. Have you ever seen people working in 
dusty uniforms with no face masks, or no uniforms, at damaged building or 
gutting houses? Those people were targeted i n  post-Katrina New Orleans 
under the law passed by the Louisiana legislature in 2002, called 
"Operating a Vehicle without Lawful Presence in the United States."9 1  But 
the euphemism of this statute is "Driving While Undocumented." The 
statute basically says that no alien student or non-resident alien shall 
operate a motor vehicle in the state without documentation demonstrating 
that the person is  lawfully present in the U . S .92 Although i t  was on the 
86. Id. §§ 1314, 1 3 1 5 ,  1 317, 1327. 
87. § 1315. 
88. 8 C.F.R. § 287(d)(3) (West 201 l ). 
89. Id. 
90. Immigration Detainers · A C h · . . . . · ompre ens1ve look, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR. (Feb. 28, 2011 ), http.//www.1mm1grat1onpolicy o g1· t f  ;· · · · r JUS - acts 1mm1grat10n-detainers-comprehensive-look. 91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14: 100.13 (2010). 
92. Id. 
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books since 2002, this law had never been enforced until Hurricane Katrina 
arrived in this city. 
In October of 2005 , police officers a l legedly trained by federal 
officials, were instructed to enforce this particular statute. This 
enforcement action led to several lawsuits attacking this statute in New 
Orleans and also in Jefferson Parish. Both district court levels held that the 
statute was preempted by federal law, which meant that the state cannot 
enforce the immigration law as it is within the federal power. 
As Professor Diamond stated the statute, on its face, is race-neutral . 
One of the Orleans Parish cases held that the actual enforcement part of it 
was race-based. The Orleans Parish Criminal District Court Judge Hunter, 
during the trial which I was observing, took over the cross-examination of 
the police officer who arrested this worker, and asked, Officer Fagan, if he 
had received training in immigration law.93 The officer responded, he was 
sent to "a one dal immigration seminar in  early 2006 because, he ' spoke a 
little Spanish. '"9 The judge asked "[ w ]ell ,  how do you know they are 
illegal aliens?"95 The officer responded "[h]ow do I know?" The judge 
inquired "[h]ow do you know if a white driver is an il legal alien?"96 The 
officer responded "I'm not really sure how to answer that."97 The court 
then asked "[h]ow do you know if a black driver is an ille�al alien?"
98 The 
officer said "I don't know how to answer that one either."9 The judge went 
on to inquire about how the officer would foossibly know if an Asian, 
Middle Eastern, or Indian was an i l legal alien. 1 0 
So based on that conversation, the judge basically determined that the 
statute was not only preempted, but its enforcement was based on the racial 
profiling on the part of the police officer, so therefore the motion to quash 
was granted. 1 0 1  Unfortunately, there were similar cases happening in 
different parts of the state that resulted in criminal prosecution based on the 
statute. There is currently a circuit split  as to the constitutionality of the 
statute, and the issue has not been resolved by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. 1 02 But as far as Orleans Parish and Jefferson Parish are concerned, 





98. Louisiana v. Herrera, No. 467-763 (La. 2/ 1 /06). 
99. Id. 
1 00. Id. 
I O I .  Id. 
1 02. Compare State v. Gonzalez-Perez, 07- 1 8 1 3  (La. App. I Cir. 2/27/08); 997 S
o. 2d I ,  7-8, 
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the statute has not been enforced, because the Fo
urth Circuit Court of 
Appeal upheld the decisions of the district c ourt that 
this law is clearly 
preempted by federal law.
1 03 However, East B aton Roug� P�rish, .
where t�e 
First Circuit Court of Appeal resides, upheld the const1tut
10nahty of this 
statute. 104 Basically the First Circuit held that Louisiana is n
ot regulating 
immigration, it is just regulating highway traffic, and thus it i s  with
in the 
state' s  power to determine who can lawfully operate a vehic le  on a state 
h . h 10
5 
1g way. 
I also want to provide the background o f  how this statute was passed 
in 2002, which i s  interesting. The title is "Prevention of  Terrorism on the 
Highways," and i t  states that the legislative purpose was to '"enact laws 
which complement federal efforts to uncover those who seek to use the 
highways of this state to commit acts o f  terror, and who seek to gain 
driver's . licenses for the purpose of masking their il legal status in the 
i o6 d .
 . . h ' h. I , . state." It was 1sappomtmg t at we weren t aware t 1s aw s existence. 
We learned from our experience that citizens ' vigilance played an important 
role in knowing this law is  on the book, as we don 't always know what 's 
going to happen as to its enforcement in other parishes. Again, 
unfortunately the Louisiana Supreme Court s o  far has not taken up any 
writs or appeals filed by the criminal defense bar. 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: Something strikes me about 
the stated concern about terrorism. It reminds one verrc m uch of the 
Japanese exclusion and interment cases from World War I I ,  07 and what we 
recall about those cases is that the Japanese citizens and Americans of 
Japanese descent were subjected to curfews and to interment in World War 
II, the reason being vital concern about nat i onal security. The Supreme 
Court accepted that this concern about national security during wartime, 
concern about sabotage in the zone of the interior, did in fact constitute a 
compelling interest, and t�e court found that the means of subj ecting ethnic 
Jap.ane�e. 
to curfew and mtemment was narrowly tailored to the end of 
m amtammg security. 108 
The end of the story, however, i s  not with the curfew s  and the 
rehearing denied 09-0292 (La 1 2/ 1 8/09)· 23 S 3d 93 · 
b ti . 
· 
' 
o. 0 (concluding that law was not preempted y e
.deral law), with State v. Lopez, 05-0685 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 2/20/06)· 948 So ?d 1 p I 1 PS (findmg law was preempted by federal law). 
' . - - ' -
I 03. Lopez, 948 So. 2d at l l  2 5 .  
1 04. Gonzalez-Perez, 997 So. 2 d  at 7-8. 
l 05. Id. 
1 06. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 4 : 1 00. 1 1  (20 1 0). 
1 07. Korematsu v. United States 323 U S  2 1 4  ( I  . 
8 1  ( 1 943). 
' · · 944):  Hirabayash i  v. United States, 320 U.S. 
1 08. See Korematsu, 323 U.S.  2 14; Hirabayashi, 3 20 U.S .  8 1 .  
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internment but that years later, it emerged that the government lied about 
the national security interest. In fact, there was no concern about terrorism. 
As a result, writs of coram nohis were granted in the case of Fred 
K 1 09 d G d H .  b h. 1 1 0 s · · 1 l orematsu an or on 1ra ayas 1 .  1 m 1  ar y, one wonders whether 
Louisiana has a true concern about terrorism, or if this purported concern is 
simply the vehicle for the state to do what it wants to do anyway with 
respect to undocumented aliens. Again, I don't know the answer, but I 
think our history of Koramatsu and Hirabayashi suggests to us that we 
ought to be concerned about what that answer is .  
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I would j ust add one more comment 
regarding the proposed law. As new substantive immigration crimes are 
added to state criminal codes, there is l ittle formal tracking of enforcement 
levels. The federal government has a much better system of tracking of 
enforcement levels of federal criminal statutes. But, at the state level, often 
data is recorded by category of crime, rather than specific code section. 
Louisiana is  one state, however, that has tracked enforcement of the 
new immigration crime on its books--driving while undocumented. 1 1 1  I 
submitted a Public Records Act request to the state of Louisiana regarding 
enforcement of this 2002 law, which punishes those who operate a vehicle 
without lawful presence in the United States with up to one year of hard 
labor and a fine of up to $ 1 000 . 1 12 The enforcement pattern that emerges is 
interesting. First, in 2003, 2004, and 2005 there was only one prosecution 
under the driving while undocumented law. 1 1 3 In fact, prosecution under 
the law did not begin in earnest until 2006. 1 1 4 The initial cases brought 
under the law mostly resulted in sentences of probation and a fine. 1 1 5 Later, 
after one Louisiana appellate court found that the law was not preempted, 
1 1 6 
we started to see a movement towards prison sentences. 1 1 7 In 2009, there 
were nineteen people sentenced to prison, and only seven sentenced to 
probation under the Louisiana driving while undocumented law. 1 1 8 
109. Korcmatsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1 406 ( 1 984). 
1 10. l l irabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 59 1 ( 1 987). 
1 1 1 .  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 4 : 1 00. 13  (20 1 0). 
1 1 2. Enforcement Data, Louisiana Laws with respect to Nonresident Aliens or Alien Students 
Statistical Analysis Center, Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement (July, I 20 1 0) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter Louisiana Enforcement Data]. 
1 1 3. /d. 
1 14. Id. 
1 1 5. Id. 
1 1 6. State v. Lopez, 05-0685 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1 2/20/06); 948 So. 2d 1 1 2 1 ,  1 1 25. But see State 
v. Gonzalez-Perez, 07- 1 8 1 3  (La. App. I Cir. 2/27/08); 997 So. 2d I ,  7-8, rehearing denied 09-
0292 (La. 1 211 8/09); 2 3  So. 3d 930 (concluding that law was not preempted by federal law). 
1 1 7. Louisiana Enforcement Data, supra note 1 1 2 .  
1 1 8. Id. 
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U nderstanding these shifts in sentencing outcomes for state immigration 
crimes is something that I think is important for future research. 
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR ! :  Excellent. 
Well, maybe I could just inject another question for the panel to consider, 
which is the question of due process rights. We've talked today, both in the 
earlier panel and now, about equal protection analysis as well as about 
preemption, but I haven't heard any discussion yet about due process. I 
wonder if any of the panelists have some thoughts about what due process 
adds to this debate. 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: Well, I might have some 
thoughts about that. I ' m  of a radical set, and in that respect, I share a 
particular piece of radicalism with Justice Thomas. I believe that the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is under­
recognized, indeed, nearly unrecognized in our jurisprudence. This clause 
was the subject of great disservice in the Slaughterhouse Cases . 1 1 9  What 
those of us who have read the Slaughterhouse Cases know is that this 
constitutes the first and only time when a clause of the United States 
C onstitution has been interpreted to mean, for all practical purposes, 
h . 120 not mg. 
It does strike me, as it struck Justice Thomas in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 1 2 1  the rights that Supreme Court jurisprudence protects as 
incorporated and thus protected against state intrusion under the 1 4th 
Amendment's Due Process Clause might more logically be protected under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 122 In McDonald, decided this last 
summer on the question of whether the S econd Amendment right to keep 
and bear arms is a right that extends against state encroachment the majority 
1 1 9 .  The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S . 36 (1872). 
1 20. Id. Justice Field, dissenting in the Slaughterhouse Cases, was first to recognize this point: 
[U�der th� _majority opinion, t]hc amendment docs not attempt to confer any new privileges 
or 1mmumhcs upon citizens or to c t d fi · · 
h 
. . ' numcra c or c me those already existing. It assumes that 
t ere are such pnv1leges and im 't' h' h · · · 
d . 
mum 1cs w 1c belong of right to c1t1zcns as such and 
or ams that they shall not be abrid d b S 1 · · · · · · · 
• 
to rivil d . 
. . .gc Y late cg1slat1on. l f th1s mh1b111on has no reference P . chge� an . 1�muml!cs of this character, but only refers, as held by the maJ'ority of the court m t  cir opm1on to such p 
· · 1 d · · · 
d · t d . h C 
' 
nvi egcs an 1mmumt1cs as were before its adoption specially 
cs1gna c m t e onstit r · 1 · · 
States it was 








an idle enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most 
immunities thus de1 � t 
�ngress and the people on its passage. With privileges and 
new constitutional 
sign� � or impltc� no State could ever have interfered by its laws, and no 
provision was rcqmrcd to inhibit such interference 
Id. at 96; see also CHARLES L BLAC J 
. 
U 
· K, R., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM· HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED 
AND NNAMED 56-69 ( 1997) "I h , . . . . . 
1 ' 






urt s view, the 'pnv1leges or immunities' clause had no amng. emp as1s m ongmal). Id. at 66. 121. McDonald v. City of Chica 130 S C 
1 22. id. 
go
, · t. 3020, 3059 (20 1 0) (Thomas, J . ,  concurring) . 
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of the court confirmed that it is a right, but only four of the members opined 
that this is a right to be subjected to Due Process analysis, involving the 
question of whether the right is fundamental and thus protected . 1 23 Justice 
Thomas, who would discard the protection of n on-procedural rights under 
the Due process Clause, 124 wrote that we ought to consider the right under 
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 125 
My position is that the right to cross state lines is protected as a 
fundamental right, 126 and while unlike Justice Thomas I have no hesitation 
in accepting the right's protection under the Due Process C lause, I would 
maintain that it ought to be protected under the Privileges and Immunities 
clause as well. But Justice Thomas stands alone in his position and it seems 
there is no majority of the Supreme C ourt willing to accept such an 
argument. And so, I think we have to look at that right as a function of the 
sort of liberty, and I think a fundamental liberty of citizens, indeed, of 
persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, to cross state lines . 1 27 
On that basis, if it is a fundamental right o f  citizens, indeed, persons to 
travel across state lines and to negotiate our way from a foreign country into 
the United States, subj ect to regulation by the federal government, there arc 
arguments to be made that states who interfere in the federal scheme of 
regulation are interfering with a liberty protected under the Due Process 
Clause irrespective of equal protection concerns. 
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I agree with Professor Armstrong that 
equal protection and due process are important to these debates, yet they 
1 23. Id. at 3026. 
1 24. In the view of Justice Thomas, the Due Process Clause "speaks only to 'process,"' and not 
to substantive rights . Id. at 3059. 
1 25. Id. at 3059, 306 1 -62. 
1 26. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U . S. 489 ( 1 999). 
Despite fundamentally differing views concerning the coverage of the Privi leges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, most notably expressed in the majority 
and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 ( 1 872), it has always 
been common ground that this Clause protects the third component of the right to travel.  
Writing for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Miller explained that one of 
the privileges conferred by this Clause "is that a citi zen of the United States can, of his own 
volition, become a citizen of any State of the Union by a bona fide residence therein, with the 
same rights as other citizens of that State." Id. at 80. Justice Bradley, in dissent, used even 
stronger language to make the same point: "The states have not now. if they ever had, any 
power to restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons. A citizen of the United States h.as 
a perfect constitutional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim 
citizenship therein, and an equality of rights with every other citizen; and the whole powe� of 
the nation is pledged to sustain him in that right. He is not bound to crin.gc to any superior, 
or to pray for any act of grace, as a means of enjoying all the rights and privileges enjoyed by 
other citizens." Id. at 1 1 2- 1 1 3 .  
Id. at 503-04. 
1 27. See id. 
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tend to be omitted from the dominant discourse. Consider the example of 




' s  chal lcn9f
x 
to the Arizona law was hea�d 
first by the United States D1stnct Court. The federal govern�ent s 
challenge is based almost exclusively on a claim of federal preemption of 
state law in the area of immigration and docs not incorporate equal 
protection or due process claims. 1 29 I think it is important to recognize, 
however, that other challenges to the l aw have inc luded such claims. For 
example, a suit brought by a coalition o f  civil rights groups-including 
MALDEF, APALC, the ACLU, and the National Immigration Law 
Center-alleges that the law violates equal protection because it was 
enacted with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race and national 
origin. 130 In addition, the same suit a lleges that portions of the law violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment's  guarantee o f  due process by allowing law 
enforcement to, among other things, detain persons in order to determine 
their immigration status. 1 3 1  The district court judge in the case, Friendly 
House v. Whiting, recently found that the plaintiffs '  equal protection and 
due process claims were sufficient to survive the Governor's motion to 
dismiss. 132 As these c laims are further developed in the courts, I expect that 
concerns about racial profiling and due process will also draw more 
attention in the public debate. 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: It strikes me that your 
comments bring something else to mind. I am a legal historian by trade or 
perhaps by practice, and your remarks remind me of Plessy v. Ferguson, an 
1 896 case which gave us "separate but equal.  " 1 33 Plessy was an octoroon, 
not distinguishable from most of the peopl e  in this room and he argued in 
ex rel. Plessy, the case before the Louisiana Supreme Court that was 
appealed to the U. S .  Supreme Court, that judgments had been made about 
h . . l 134 is rac1a status on the basis of his appearance. The court noted the 
possibility that the people running the railroad might make a mistake in 
making a racial identification. 1 35 This is the same kind of mistake of racial 
id�ntifications that may well occur i n  o n  the spot enforcement of the 
Anzona statute. Ex rel. Plessy suggested that if such mistakes are made, 
1 28. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. 980 (D. Ariz. 20 1 0). 
1 29. Complaint, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d. 980 (D Ariz. 20 1 0) (No. 
2: I OCVO I41 3), 20 1 0  WL 2653363. 
. 
1 30. Complaint at 56, ii 1 87, Friendly House v. Whiting, No. CV J 0- 1 06 1 -SRB (D Ariz. 20 I 0). 
I 3 1 . Id � 1 88.  
. 








O I O), http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/Friendly-House-Order-on-Motion­o- rsmrss. . 
1 33. �Jessy v. Ferguson, 1 63 U.S. 537, 550.52 ( 1 896). 
1 34. Ex parte Plessy, 45 La. Ann. 80, 83 ( 1 893).  
1 35. Id. 
201 1 ]  Panel on Federalism i n  Practice 399 
that the object of the mistake would have a an action in tort. This could 
lead to a very fine discussion in the Arizona context of Cheryl Harris'  
seminal article, "Whiteness as Property," but time counsels against that. 1 36 
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: My thoughts on this i s  that 
immigration judges refuse to entertain any constitutional arguments that we 
make before them, however, we make such arguments everyday. For 
example, we always argue that aliens arc entitled to due process rights 
under the Constitution. Hopefully some day, when the cases go up on the 
appellate level, somebody will listen to us; yes, the U.S. Constitution should 
be rigorously enforced in the administrative immigration proceedings. 
I just wanted to share personal experience with a Japanese internment 
case. Fifteen years ago, I was a very new lawyer, wasn't practicing law 
very much because I was pregnant with my first child, and this old 
gentleman came to me and said, "Hiroko, I know you are not busy. Can 
you take a look at this document?" It was i n  a huge envelope containing 
these very brownish, old documents but I agreed because I did have a 
lenty of time to read. 
As I was reading the documents, I came to find out he was a U.S. 
;itizen born in Pala Alto, California, in 1 9 1 8 , and he went back to Japan, 
grew up there, but he came back as a young man to be an agricultural 
worker in California. And he enlisted in the Army, and there became a 
decorated Army soldier. He was fast, he was very good, and he was given 
many awards, and then Pearl Harbor h appened. And he was discharged 
without any reason whatsoever, with a bus fare, and went back to his home 
where he had no job. Then, the Executive order of 9066 was issued by 
President Roosevelt; 1 37 he had to leave Cal i fornia. He could compl y  with 
the two contradictory orders, apparently. One was that you are not 
supposed to leave your house because of the curfew, and if you were to 
leave you had to report to a location from which he would be sent to a 
concentration camp. So he decided to skip town, he left. 
Years went by. He came to New Orleans and really worked hard and 
became a very well-respected person i n  the community. He became a 
supporter of many, many people of Japanese ancestry in the New Orleans 
area. And he became an old rich man; I did not think he did not have a care 
in the world. S o  I was surprised when he told me and said, "I just wanted to 
get my honor back. Can you help me?" I realized that he lost the claim 
filed under the Civil Liberties Act at the administrative level because he 
1 36. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 1 06 HARV. L. REV. 1 709 ( 1 993) (discussing 
legal implications of racial perceptions). 
1 37. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 1 9, 1 942). 
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was not interned, he was not qualified. They basically told him "Don't 
worry about it, j ust go away." 
So I did the research and realized that we would have to file a lawsuit 
against the U.S .  government to pursue his  c laim further, so we did just that, 
and eventual ly the case was settled, and he  received the settlement, over 
fifty years after he was expelled from h is  home town. I talked to him this 
morning to get a permission to tal k  about his case specifically. He was 
really humbled by my offer. He is  ninety-two now, and "Waiting for the 
God to call me," he said. 
In the U.S .  Supreme Court decision in Korematsu the Justices 
basically upheld the constitutionality of the President's Executive Order, 
stating that : 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of 
hosti lity to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war 
with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military 
authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to 
take proper security measures, because they decided that military 
urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese 
ancestry be segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, 
because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of war in our 
military leaders-as inevitabl6 it must--deterrnined that they should 
have the power to do just this. 38 
In fact, this order's constitutional ity was affirmed based upon one 
person 's  statement, General DeW itt. 1 3 9 He was a general of the War 
Department at the time, and he basical ly  said there is evidence of espionage 
by Japanese citizens, and people of  Japanese descent. 140 Some people 
argued that this law only applies to noncitizens in the United States. 
American people were wronged by the Japanese people who had no legal 
paper who can' t  complain about this treatment. The history shows that that 
was not tme. It  makes me sad that an argument similar to thi s  is  circulating 
around this country . General DeWitt testified in San Francisco before the 
board, he said, "I don't want any o f  them here," meaning persons of 
Japanese anccstry. 1 4 1  He continued to say, 
They are a dangerous element. There is no way to determine their 
UX Korcmatsu v. United States. 323 U.S. 2 1 4, 223 ( 1 944) . 
. 
l .N. Id �It �n: see also Lt. Gen. John L. De Wilt'.\· Final Report; Japanese Evacuation.from the West ( ll<L\I NL. 1 1 11:  VIRTUAL MUSEUM OF Tl lE CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO, http://www.sfinuseum.org/ war1dcw1ttO.hhnl ( last visited Mar. I .  20 1 1 ). 
1 40. >.:11r<"111a1.,·11 • •  l23 U.S.  at 227. 
1 4 1 .  Id at 2J6. 
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loyalty. The west coast contains too many vital installations essential 
to the defense of the country to allow any Japanese people on this 
coast . . . . The danger of the Japanese was, and is now-if they are 
permitted to come back-espionage and sabotage. It makes no 
difference whether he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. 
American citizenship does not necessarily determine loyalty . . . . But 
we must worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the 
map. Sabotage and espionage will make problems as long as he is 
II d . h'  142 a owe m t is area . . . .  
40 1 
He made this allegation without a shred of credible evidence. So the 
sentiment that emanates from this statement eerily mirrors what's 
happening in this country, in certain parts of the country, and I hope we 
don't repeat the same mistake ever again. 
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG (MODERATOR] : We have time to 
reflect together as a group, so if there are any questions that have been 
percolating in your mind, now would be the time to come to one of the 
microphones or raise your hand. 
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR JENNIFER CHACON: I have one, and it 
goes to Professor Kusuda and Professor Eagly, I think. This is about the 
driving while undocumented law, and specifically the statistics that you arc 
looking at that show an increased rate of arrests post-2006, and it made me 
think of a recent study by the Warren Institute, and they've done a couple 
now, looking at j urisdictions where 287(g) has gone into effect, noting the 
changes in the arrest profile that occurred. There seemed to be a spike in 
the arrests of Latinos. And sometimes you see more aggressive police 
enforcement after 287(g) programs have been implemented. 1 43 And the 
lead charge in those cases tends to be minor offenses, such as document­
related offenses. In Florida they looked at driving without a license, which 
obviously is something you can't really ascertain by seeing the person, so 
that may suggest that something else was motivating stops in these cases. 
And it made me wonder whether the increase that we 're seeing in the 
arrests and prosecutions of the driving while undocumented relate in any 
way to any 287(g) collaborations or whether there ' s  any kind of 
state/federal col laboration in enforcement efforts and the use of certain state 
laws in prosecutions. 
142. Id. 
!43. Trevor Gardner I I  & Aarti Kohli, The C.A.P. Ef ect: Racial Profiling in the ICE Criminal 
Alien Program, THE WARREN INSTITUTE (2009), http://www.law.bcrkclcy.edu/filcs/ 
po!icybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf; see also Immigration and Nationality Act § 287(g) ( 1 996), 8 
U.S.C. § I  357(g) (2006). 
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PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I think that is an
 important question. It 
allows me to clarify some of the l imitations of
 the data that we currently 
have available. The study you are referring to, w
hich was conducted by the 
144 c: T · C 
Warren Institute at Berkeley, was based on da
ta 1rom rav1s ounty, 
Texas. Their data was obtained from a p��}ic record
s �equcst fi led by the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Texas. The Travi s
 County data was 
very fine-grained: it  tracked defendants from the point o f  a
rrest to the point 
of prosecution and eventual removal.  However, these sort
 o f  detailed 
b . 1 4
6 
records from the point of arrest to removal arc rare and hard to o 
tam. 
For example, in the response that I received from the State of 
Louisiana regarding enforcement of the driving while undocumented law, 
the data were much more l imited. As the Statistical Analysis Center for the 
Louisiana Commission on Law Enforcement explained its response, "[t]he 
following are not exhaustive numbers s i nc e  we were unable to compare 
these figures with deportations by INS or fines that were imposed but not a 
part of the Department of Corrections records ." 1
47 Thus, the records that I 
referenced earlier are limited to what is c ontained in the Department of 
Corrections database. Therefore, the data docs not re flect how many people 
are being arrested and charged under the l aw without making their way into 
Department of Corrections records. 
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: Fortunately, we don ' t  have any 
2 87(g) programming in this area, however, we do have a Secure 
Communities program fully implemented in several pari shes, which is more 
troublesome, because under 28 7(g), the federal government .. trains" local 
enforcement officials which implicates a l l  kinds of complications. 14x In 
Secure .C�rnmunity, nobody has to l i ft a fi nger, as it is simply an automatic 
transm1ss1on of the fingerprint information and sharing criminal 
background data between the federal government with state j u risdictions.
149 
It is .very difficult for us to track how they implement the system and the mergmg between state and federal c riminal justice systems. ICE 
1 44. Gardner & Kohli, supra note 1 43. 
145. See generally Andrea Guttin Th C · · / At · p · · · 
Ti . C 
' e nmma 1en rugram: lmm1gratwn Enjurceme11t in 
rav1s ounty, Texas, IMMIGRATION POLICY C (F b 
-
· · · · · 
special-reports/ · · 1 r . . 
T�. e · 20l 0), http://www. 1mm1grat1onpohcy.orgt 
cnmina -a 1en-program-1mm1grat1on-enforcement-travis·county-texas 
1 46. Gardner & Kohli supra not 1 43 t 3 4 ( · · 
. 
study were "uni·q ,, d
,
" 
e ' a - explaining that the arrest records obtained for the 
ue an extremely rare"). 
14 7. Louisiana Enforcement Data, supra note 1 1 2. 
1 48. Memorandum of Agreement Between U S  D ,  , . . . . 
and Customs E ,.r, d · · 
<;partm<::nt of Homeland Securm· /mm1gratwn 
11.Jorcement an Lou · · s p 1 .  
· 
· 
http-// . Id . . 
/Siana fate o tee, LOUISIANA ST ATE POLICE ( Dec. 1 2. 2009) . . www.1ce.gov oc11�/�01a/secure_communities-moa/r_louisiana 1 1 -30-09. df. 
1 49. Secure Communities · A p-, Sh 
-
P 
http-// . . . . 
. 
. 
act eet, I M M IG RATION PC)(.ICY CTR .. (Nov. 4. 20 10) . . www.1mm1grat1onpol1cy.org/Just-facts/secure-communities-fact-shect. 
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apparently favors this program, because they intend to complete national 
wide implementation of this program by 20 1 3 .  And I understand that in 
terms of the tracking data, I can only give you anecdotal information that I 
obtained from the local criminal defense bar. According to them 
prosecution under the Louisiana Statute is basically concentrating in the 
Southeast, southeastern part of the state, because that's where the 
concentration of Latin populations are, New Orleans specifically. There arc 
many prosecutions to this day, especially the j urisdiction that upheld the 
constitutionality of the "Driving While Undocumented" statute. 1 50 I haven't 
gotten the final number yet, but so far the Louisiana Supreme Court has not 
shown any intent to deal with this situation. 
So, yes, the local enforcement is actually happening now because of 
the 287(g) programs, like in Tennessee, 1 5 1  where Professor McKanders 
practices, which is the most troublesome and prevalent. But as far as 
Louisiana is concerned, we do have more problems, as there is no one 
person to blame for racial profiling because the machine is doing its own 
work. Can machines racially profile people? That's another issue that we 
will have to litigate another day. 
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR KARLA MCKANDERS: I have a 
question for Professor Diamond. I have been doing research on the 1 850 
Fugitive Slave Act, 1 52 and the administrative body that it created, that issued 
certificates of removal to send slaves back to the slaveholding state and the 
slave owner. And I was wondering, have you done any research in this 
area? 
And then my second question i s  some immigration scholars have 
indicated that comparing the early system migration of African slaves to 
America is not a valid, shouldn't be included in an immigration system 
because Africans were considered property, and I was wondering what your 
thoughts are on using that justification to exclude the migration of African­
Americans in the United States from our conception of immigration law? 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: As to the first question, I 've 
not researched this recently, but as to the second, I disagree. I think the 
1 808 Clause, as does the rest of the Constitution, recognizes implicitly 
though not explicitly that Africans brought to the country as slaves were 
1 50. State v. Gonzalez-Perez, 07-1 8 1 3  (La. App. I Cir. 2/27/08); 997 So. 2d I ,  7-8, rehearing 
denied 09-0292 (La. 12/ 1 8/09); 23 So. 3d 930. 
1 5 1 .  Memorandum of Agreement, TENNESSEE HIGHWAY PATROL (Oct. 1 5 , �009), 
http://www.ice.gov/ doc Ji  b/foia/ memorandumsofAgreement U nderstanding/r _ 287 gten nesseehtghw 
aypatrol l O l  509.pdf. 
1 52. Fugitive Slave Act, 9 Stat. 463 ( 1 850). 
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property. While implicitly the Constitution addresses Afri�ans brought into 
the country and Africans in the country as s lave� or free, _
it addresses them 
explicitly only as "persons."1 53 A very inter�s�mg conflict was presented 
between two different sets of anti-slavery activists. Some argued that the 
315 Clause, the 1 808 Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause were clearly 
1 53. The Constitution does not explicitly mention slavery and race and deals squarely with the 
issue of slavery in only three places. Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3, the "3/5 Clause." apportioned 
direct or capitation taxes and membership in the House of Representatives in accordance with 
population, but counted a slave as only three-fifths of a person. Article I. Section 9, Clause 1 .  the 
1 808 Clause, forbade Congress to limit the importation of slaves until 1 808, a period of twenty 
years. Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, the Fugitive Slave C lause, provided that fugitive slaves 
who escaped into another state would be returned to their owners. Yet, the wording in each 
instance is delicate. The 3/5 Clause provides: 
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may 
be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be 
detennined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service 
for a Term of Y cars, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. 
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3. The 1 808 Clause provided: 
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think 
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight 
hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten 
dollars for each Person. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. l .  And the Fugitive Slave Clause, in language that could be applied to 
indentured servants as well as escaped slaves, provided: 
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or 
Labour may be due. 
U.S.  CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. Antislavery activists would argue that these indirect references to 
slaves meant that the Constitution was an antislavery document. See, e.g. , 2 THE FREDERICK 
DOUGLASS PAPERS 226-27 (John W. Blassingame ed. 1 979) (remarks of Samuel R. Ward, Jan. 
1 7, 1 850) [hereinafter DOUGLASS PAPERS) ; see also 3 id. at 385-86 (Douglass' address entitled 
What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? (July 5, 1 852)); 3 id. at 1 5 1 -62 (remarks during a debate 
on whether the Constitution is  antislavery in intent (May 20-2 1 ,  1 857)); id. at 1 63,  1 8 1 -83 
(address on the Dred Scott decision (May 1 4, 1 857)); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, 
FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 73- 1 02 ( 1 970). 
Antislavery forces were far from unanimous on this position. See, e.g., WILLIAM PHILLIP, THE 
CONSTITUTION A PRO-SLAVERY COMPACT ( 1 856); see a/so W ILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES 
OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1 760- 1 848, at 229-48 ( 1 977). Even 
Douglass at one time had argued that the effect of the Constitution and the intent of its framers 
was t� be a proslavery document. See 2 DOUGLASS PAPERS, supra, at 23 1 -3 2  (remarks of 
Frederick Douglass (Jan. 1 7, 1 850)). 
Debat� on the pro-slavery effect and intent behind the Constitution is a matter as well of more 
recent vmtage Just' c Th d M h JI 
C . 
. . · 1 e urgoo ars a argued the pro-slavery underpinnings of the 
onst1tut1on m The c u 1 · , B .  . / 
V 
ons 1 u wn s zcentenma : Commemorating the Wrong Document? 40 
AND. L. REV. 1 337 ( 1 987) H b'  . . . . . . 
W . 1 1 . 
· e was su �ected to great cnt1c1sm for his pos1t1on See e g. 1 iam Bradford R Id A h . 
. ' . ' 
1 3  3 . 
eyno s, not er View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 V AND. L. REV. 4 ( 1 987) [heremafter Reyn Id A h v· ] . l 'b . 
0 s, not er 1ew ; see also William Bradford Reynolds Securing ' erty m an Egalitarian Ag 52 Mo L R 
• 
liberty] . But see . . 
e,
. 
· · E� . 585  ( 1 987) [hereinafter Reynolds, Securing 
Reynolds 52 Mo L
M
�hael Middleton, Securing Justice: A Response to William Bradford 
Marshall;s Th . 
· ·
h 
EV. 607 < 1 987); Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glorv: Thurgood esis on t e Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 V AND. L. REV. 93 ( l 989). 
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pro-slavery, rendering the Constitution a pro-slavery document. 1 54 Others 
argued that the avoidance of the term "slave" or "slavel(s" evinced an 
implicit purpose not to give constitutional warrant to slavery. 55 
The language of the 1808 Clause is that "[t]he Migration or 
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think 
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited b y  the Congress prior to the Year 
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on 
such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person." 1 56 While the 
expression "[i]mportation of such Persons as any of the States now existing 
shall think proper to admit" suggests that Africans were objects of 
commerce, the language "[ m ]igration . . . o f  such Persons as any of the 
States now existing shall think proper to admit" speaks to a recognition that 
enslaved Africans were in fact people. 
There is a case, the first of the Negro seamen cases, in which Justice 
Johnson sitting as a circuit justice in 1823, ruled on a South Carolina statute 
which forbade Negro sailors from disembarking at port. 157 Justice Johnson 
recognized that it was Congress' power under the Commerce Clause that 
would allow for it to regulate the passage of persons into the country. 1 58 He 
wrote of free persons, and yet it was the same Commerce Clause which 
would allow for Congress to regulate trade in persons into the country. 1 59 
Congress's commercial regulatory authority extended to trade in persons 
who were property, thus allowing Congress to regulate the African slave 
trade, but Congress's  power to "establish an uniform Rule of 
Naturalization"1 60 necessarily involves either as a matter of implied power 
or necessary and proper power, the power to regulate immigration as well, 
the power to admit or deny entry to aliens who would be subjects of a rule 
of naturalization. Hence, I disagree with the critics. The Commerce Clause 
certainly allows for Congress to regulate the African slave trade, and that 
point standing alone would support those who disagree with me. But I 
would suggest that congressional power, pretermitted by the 1 808 Clause, 
to regulate the migration or importation of a single class of individuals­
"such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to 
admit," not persons in the first instance and property in the second--carries 
with it, either as a matter of implied power or necessary and proper power, 
1 54. Marshall, supra note 153; Middleton, supra note 153; and Diamond, supra note 153. 
1 55. Reynolds, Another View, supra note 153; Reynolds, Securing Liberty, supra note 1 53. 
1 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. 
I 57. Elikson v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 493 (C.C.S.C. I 823) (No. 4,366). 
1 58. Id. at 495. 
1 59. Id. 
1 60. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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· · t
. ell Again, I disagree with the the power to regu ate immigra ion as w . 
critics. 
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR I :  Thank you . 
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR BILL ONG HING: I would like to ask a 




s n�t going to be too far 
afield; if it is, you don' t  have to answer it, but I thmk it connects to some of 
the points that were made earlier on. I was flipping through the CLE 
materials that were handed out earlier today, and I was shocked when I 
came across, and maybe I shouldn't be shocked, but I was nonetheless, at 
an amicus brief that is contained within these materials in the Arizona, 
Legal Arizona Workers Act case in the Supreme Court, the amicus brief as 
put in by the Chamber of Commerce, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, that 
it, is the same U.S.  Chamber of Commerce that has been instrumental in 
funneling money from known and unknown sources to candidates who are 
incredibly hostile to the rights of undocumented migrants and others. 1 6 1  
So to be taking a position i n  litigation that a state law that penalizes 
undocumented migrants, albeit by imposing sanctions against employers 
who hire them, seems to some degree surprising. So to what extent is there 
maybe a hopeful, and I realize that it's not e ntirely hopeful, to what degree 
is there a strategy in litigation through this kind of almost an idea of a 
citizen proxy, where you have literally an organization that represents U.S. 
citizens and companies which, in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, 
stand on equal footing with those citizens for purposes of donating money 
to candidates. Does this in some way kind of break up or shake up how we 
think about litigation which so far today has been presented mainly through 
the model of preemption? 
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: It is important to work with non­
traditional partners. For example, American Immigration Lawyers 
Association and U.S. Chamber of Commerce oftentimes form an alliance 
commonly referred to as "strange bedfellows." Putting aside the 
differences, there is  a case that they have teamed up in the past in getting a 
number of worker visas increased. n;2 
I am concerned there is also a direct relationship between the 
�orporate profit and immigrant detention. For example, a corporation may 
introduce a bill written by their lobbyists, such as the case with the 
Correction Corporation of America, a for-profit company that earns profit 
1 6 1 .  Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners Chamber of 
Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 1 30 S. Ct. 534 (20 1 0) (No. 90-1 1 5), 20 10 WL 350 1 l80. 
1 62.  Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Chertoff, 8 : 08-cv-03444-AW (D. Md. S . D. 2008). 
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from incarcerating noncitizens, which has been reported to be actively 
involved in drafting state legislation that favors their position. In terms of 
forming a litigation strategy, we do pick our partners, well, as long as our 
interests overlap. We also work with various religious groups. The 
Catholic Church takes a very strong position on migration and admission of 
immigrants in this country. On certain issues we disagree; however, there 
has been a very strong working relationship between us and them. W e  also 
work with the Lutheran Church. 
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR BILL ONG HING: Thank you. y OU 
know, well also, the Chief of Staff, actually is on the B oard o f  the 
Department of Corrections. But, you know i f  you look at the litigants in 
some of the cases mentioned, some of the plaintiffs actually were business 
owners, they were landlords, and they were a restaurant owner, and others. 
They used that litigation strategy as well, and that puts, that played a critical 
role. And I think you are right, that it's a strategy that is important. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I'm wondering, to what extent we ought to 
take some lessons from what happened a couple of days ago in Iowa, where 
three of the state Supreme Court justices who were on the court when it 
held; I'm not really familiar with who or what the law was, but basically it 
held that same-sex marriage was constitutional. 163 And then, these three 
justices were voted out of office in an election, where typically they had 
been re-elected. 1 64 
I am wondering whether we should take any lessons from that in this 
context because here we are dealing with folks who are: A) noncitizens, 
who are, in this political climate, not very popular, and that' s  not a unique 
event as we all know. But B), you compound that with the fact that they 
have some involvement with the criminal justice system. So you have two 
groups of people, or two interactions, two statuses which make a person not 
popular, and you provide them in one individual, and that makes them 
really not popular. And, so I'm wondering to what extent we should take 
lessons from what happened in Iowa, given that most state court judges are 
elected, just like they are in Iowa. 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: Your question puts the 
following question to me. Which is it, what is  the .deci�ion�making b?dy which ought to be making these decisions about nrumgration, �bort1on, 
racial or gender or sexual preference discrimination, or anything else 
controversial? I do not speak to these other matters, though I do note a 
163. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). 
164. See Chris Geidner, Jn Iowa, Judges Are Ousted, M ETRO WEEKLY (Nov. 3, 20 1 0. 1 : 1 6
 
AM), http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/20 I 01 I I /in-iowa-judges-are.html. 
408 Loyola Journal of Public Interest Law 
[Vol. 1 2  
substantial history o f  courts undertaking decision-making_ on _then:i, but I 
think that there is an argument that these issues of 1mm1gratton arc 
inherently political, and that the Constitution recognizes that it's Congress' 
power to make these decisions. 
I have argued today that it is not constitutional for the st�te to _
make 
certain sorts of decisions about immigration, as has been done m Arizona. 
As a political matter, it  may be the better course of action for C ongress to 
act, to undertake actively to refuse that which Arizona and other states arc 
doing now--or to make a decision, a political decision, to confirm the 
judgment of the states, even if not their particular legislation. 
One wonders if we would be in a better place if we have an active 
national discussion, about what our immigration policy ought to be, instead 
of having discussions in our courts about the limits of immigration policy, 
in a way which potentially exposes the judiciary to the criticism that is 
displacing the political will of the states on a matter inherently political. 
Moreover, many of the critics will fail-whether deliberately obtuse or 
not-to recognize that there are legal and not simply policy issues that are 
likely to control results in legal challenges to state immigration 
enforcement. 
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I have one question. Ok, you talk about 
immigration and illegal immigrants. And I guess my question is,  where we 
do we stop? Do we let everyone in from an impoverished nation; they 
could just walk in, illegally, across our borders? I mean, I think that we 
have a right to exist without having to be taxed to support people who 
cannot afford it, that are not citizens. And, I don't understand. I do 
understand, like with the Japanese, I thought what they' ve done [the United 
States government] was terrible, and I d o  understand some of the things, 
there was a young man in the paper who had served in the military, was 
honorably discharged, and now they want to send him back because he's an 
illegal alien. 
But at some point, the American people have to take a stand. 
Ap�arently, Washington and our national government is not going to, so are 
we JUSt hopeless and defenseless in our own country? We have to wait for 
them to de�ide what they're going to d o  about controlling i mmigration, or 
�houl� we Just open our borders to every poor country? Africa, the people 
m Chma who are treated so terribly, India, you know any poor country or 
country where the people are treated terribly.  Do we just have to open our 
borders to them and let them over here? When we are excluding scientists, 
and doctors, and statesmen, and teachers and professors? 
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR] : Thank you. 
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Professor Eagly, would you like to comment on some of the issues she 
raises? 
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I am happy to start a conversation 
regarding your question. We do have a very large undocumented 
population in the United States-over eleven million undocumented people 
are present in this country by recent estimates. 165 You highlight the 
question of whether unauthorized migration should be addressed through 
enforcement or rather through comprehensive immigration reform. I realize 
that there is public sentiment, like the sentiment that you express, favoring 
increased enforcement. However, there is also strong public sentiment 
favoring immigration reform. 
AUDIENCE RESPONSE: It could be, you know, overhauling the 
immigration law, but I just think that we have to have, the people of the 
United States who are citizens here, have to feel  their citizenship counts for 
something. 
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I think you are raising issues that go to 
the heart of these debates. One of the things that we have to think about 
when we are looking at enforcement at the local level is not just whether the 
locality has the authority to enforce the law, but also whether we want a 
unifonn immigration policy. Overall, we have a national immigration 
policy that focuses very little on enforcement. As the system has evolved, 
we increasingly rely on the criminal justice system to funnel migrants into 
the deportation system. Within this civil-criminal enforcement system, if 
localities function differently with respect to their prioritizations of certain 
crimes, the immigration functioning at the local level can vary drastically 
from region to region. For example, data released recently under the federal 
Secure Communities program in response to a Freedom of Information Act 
request, reveals how many people were removed as a result of certain . . 1 66 h cnmmal convictions at the county level. From county to county t ere are 
different prioritizations of removals. Some counties focus on those who are 
convicted of serious felonies, while others have higher rates o f  removal of 
those who have been convicted of only a petty crime, or have no criminal 
record at all.167 
1 65. MICHAEL HOEFER NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN C. BAKER, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
OFFICE OF IMMIGR. STAT.: ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING 
IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2008, 2-3 & fig. I (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois _ ill_pe _ 2008.pdf. 
1 66. See U.S. I MMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES: NATIONWIDE 
INTEROPERABILITY BY CONVICTION REPORT (20 I 0), available at http://www.icc.gov/doclib/foial 
secure_ communities/nationwide_ interoperability_ conviction-july.pdf. 
1 67. Id. 
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So, on a de facto level, we see the criminal system fostering very 
different immigration policies at the local level. I will stop there to let the 
other panelists respond to these questions. 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: Well, I think the question 
really speaks a frustration which is shared by very, very many in the 
country. But the problem is larger than simply illegal immigration. During 
the days of the Prohibition, we couldn' t  protect our border to the north from 
importation of alcohol. 168 In today 's world, we can't protect our borders 
from cocaine coming into the country from South America, or from heroin 
and other drugs coming in from Asia, or any drug coming in from 
Mexico, 169 and many sense that we cannot protect our borders against entry 
by persons unauthorized by immigration authorities. We try mightily, and 
we do many effective things but many things we do are ineffective and 
whether effective or not, whatever we do is expensive. I think all of this 
helps explain the sort of frustration expressed by the question. 
Having said this, the question really is, what are our political decision­
makers going to do with that frustration. As citizens, we have the right to 
ask them to do something about our frustration. The statute in Arizona, as 
well as bills in Louisiana and elsewhere, along with the positions taken by 
the nine states and eighty-eight members of Congress, in signing briefs in 
support of the Arizona statute170-al1 are indications that political decision 
makers sense frustration. I think a very significant question is whether the 
right political power center is acting. That power center, given the 
Supremacy Clause, does not reside anywhere in state government, but in 
Congress. States don't  make immigration law, and the federal c ourts don't 
make immigration law either. So I will c onfirm what the questioner doesn't 
need any confirmation of, that these are legitimate concerns. 
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: I wanted to share the most recent Pew 
Hispanic Centers report on documented immigrants in this country. 
Apparently a most recent report estimated about 1 1 .9 million 
undocumented people in this country. 1 7 1  And apparently the population 
1 68. DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION 2 ) ,  ) 06-07 ( )  979). 
1 69. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE NAT' L DRUG I NTELLIGENCE CTR. No. 2 0 1 0-Q03 1 7-001 , 
NA TI ONA� DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 20 I 0, http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/3 866 1 I. 
1_70. Bnef for States of Michigan, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, 




6645), 2 0 1 0  WL 5 1 62508; Brief for Members of 
ongress Bnan B ilbray, et al. as Am1c1 Cunae Supporting Defendants-Appellants, United States v. Anzona (20 1 0) (No. 1 0-1 6645), 201 0  WL 5 1 62520;  Brief of Intervenor-Appellant Arizona State Senator Russell Pearce Supporting Defendants-Appellants United States v. Arizona (201 0) (No. 1 0- 1 6645), 201 0  WL 5 1 625 1 6. 
' 
1 7 1 .  Jeffrey Passel & D'Vera Cohn A p · · 
S 
' ortra1t of Unauthorized Immigrants in the United fates, PEW HISPANIC CTR., i (Apr. 14, 201  O), http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/ I 07_pdf. 
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grew very rapidly between 1 990-2006. However, the number apparently 
has since stabilized, and in this new analysis the center estimates that the 
rapid growth of unauthorized immigrant workers also has halted. 172 It finds 
that there are 8.3 million undocumented immigrants in the U.S.  labor force 
in March of 2008. 173 
I agree with your position that we can't keep accepting people from all 
over the world without proper rules and procedures in place. One of which 
I think is very important, for the U .S.  government to do, is that w e  have to 
demand accountability from employers. According to the most recent 
announcement from the Secretary of Department of Homeland Security, 
"[s]ince January 2009, ICE has audited more than 3200 employers 
suspected of hiring illegal labor."174 They audited "225 companies and 
individuals, and imposed approximately $50 million in financial 
sanctions."175 This doubled the total amount of audits administered during 
the entire previous administration. 176 
That being said, there are still not enough employer sanctions. My 
personal experience dealing with a worksite raid in 2008, which was the 
largest immi
firation raid in the history of the United States, occurred in 
Mississippi. 1 And almost 600 arrests were made of a varietv of workers, 
U S  . . (18 h . . citizens, green card holders, and undocumented people. T e most 
recent report noted that only one employee manager of the company that 
hired over 3000 workers was charged and convicted. 179 So here is evidence 
of the federal government not doing its job. There is already a law on the 
books, which was passed to punish U.S.  employers who hire undocumented 
workers, which has to be enforced. And also, yes, we do have to worry 
about people who are fleeing from persecution as we have an international 
obligation to protect human rights. Also as one of the most powerful 
nations in the country, the United States should take a leadership role in 
stabilizing a country that is going through civil turmoil. For example, 
Somalia where there is no functioning government since 1 99 1 ,  and 
1 72. Id. 
1 73. Id. 
1 74. Secretary Napolitano Announces Record-breaking Immigration Enforcement Statistics 
Achieved under the Obama Administration, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY (Oct. 6, 201 0), 
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr _ 1 286389936778.shtm. 
1 75. Id. 
1 76. Id 
1 77. Feds detain nearly 600 in Miss. plant raid, MSNBC.COM (Aug. 26, 2008, 7: 1 1  PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/2641 0407/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/. 
1 78. Id. 
· · B k. the Law Doesn 't Pay, FED'N FOR 1 79. Interior Jmmigratwn Enforcement- rea 1�g . _ 
. . _ 
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, http://www.fairus.org/s1te/News2?page-N
ewsArt1cle&1d-
l664 1 &security= l60l&news_iv _ctrl=l007 (last visited Mar. 1 ,  201 1
). 
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Honduras where people are suffering the gang violence. Some have gco­
and socio-political issues that may be beyond our control, however, I do 
share your concern that we can do better than we have been doing in 
executing our obligations. 
RESPONSE FROM PROFESSOR BILL ONG HING: I actually want to 
disagree a little bit with the last two panelists' comments, a couple of 
points, and respond to your concerns. 
First of all,  part of the reasoning that you gave for your frustration 
over undocumented immigration that I think, Professor Diamond, you 
implicitly agreed with, when you said that you understand the sheer 
frustration and that there is a solid basis for that frustration. That ' s  the part 
I would ask us to be cautious about, because part of your frustration as I 
understood it, one o f  the phrases or sentences that you used was with 
respect to the cost of the immigrants, that we as citizens are bearing. 
That's something we should be a little bit careful about because I've 
read the economic reports, that's what I do every time there ' s  a new 
economic report done on the economic impact of immigrants, and they are 
basically two-fold. One is with respect to employment displacement, and 
the other is with respect to costs, hard costs. And believe me, we didn't get 
into it, taxwise, and employment creation-wise by the immigrants that are 
here, especially when it comes to undocumenteds. Undocumenteds put in 
way more than you or I put in proportionally that is taken back out in terms 
of our tax refunds, in terms of our services, and you only have to look at the 
immigration policy center website and each individual state that they've 
looked at with respect to both of those issues, you will find the states with 
the most immigrants, every decade for the last I 00 years, have the lowest 
unemployment rates.1 80 The states with the least number of immigrants 
have the highest unemployment rate. 1 8 1  
The other thing that I would be a little bit cautious about i s  stating 
that, and I think you said that we' re "excluding" professionals and 
scientists. In fact, that's not true of the scientists and the people with 
professional abilities. Their visas are pretty plentiful. It' s actually the 
families, you know, family categories that have to wait many, many years, 
okay: It's not the professionals you are alluding to. We can go look at the 
website
_ 
of the immigration numbers; there' s  not a backlog in those 
categones. Those folks get to come in. 
I 80. Rob Para] & Madura Wijewardena, The Unemployment and Immigration Disconnect: Untying the Knot Part I of III,. lMMIGRA�ON POLICY CTR. 3 (May 19, 2009), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/ spec1al-reports/untymg-knot-senes-unemployment-and-immigration. 
1 8 1 .  Id. 
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And with enforcing employer sanctions, there's a real problem when 
we are blaming the employers, okay? I agree a hundred percent, and you 
didn't say this, okay? That employers exploit the hell out of undocumented 
workers, okay? Not all of them, but a lot of them do. And there are a lot of 
ways of going after those employers that explo it undocumented workers, 
without the use of employer sanctions. There are health and safety laws, 
there are minimum wage laws, and there arc other conditional laws. I offer 
enforcing those, and the truth is, if you enforce those laws, you may in fact 
make those jobs a little bit more appealing to lawful residents and citizens 
of the United States. 
So I'm all for that, let's go after the employers who exploit, but let's 
go after them with labor laws and employment laws. Because the problem 
with employer sanctions laws is that they buy into the notion that there's a 
problem with undocumented migration, and I don't think there' s  a problem 
with undocumented immigration. 
If you were here earlier, and li stened to a little bit of what I said, we 
have to understand why people are here. And I think if we understood why 
people are here, we 'd calm down, because a lot of what the reasons that 
people are here, they ' re way beyond the control of their movement. It's 
more within our control as shareholders of corporations that our, that our 
investment, our retirement funds are invested in. We have got to be 
complaining to these multinational corporations that our mutual funds are 
invested in. That's where the power is.  We shouldn't  be blaming the 
undocumented. 
Nobody is asking the United States to take every poor person in the 
world, but I will agree with one thing that' s  implicit in what you are saying, 
and that's that I do not believe that more enforcement money or a very 
generous amnesty will  solve the undocumented immigration problem. Let 
me repeat that-the most generous legalization program and spending 
billions more at the border, neither one of those is going to solve the 
undocumented immi gration problem. That problem is not going to be 
solved until we work with those countries and get them to shape up with 
their economy, and I ' m  telling you, the United States has, is complicit in 
that. 
It doesn' t  take a brain surfeon to figure.out that the United �
tates has 
more to gain from NAFTA, 1 8  that the Umted States corporations have 
more to gain from the WT0, 1 83 which is NAFTA on steroids. Let's not 
blame the people who are really economic refugees. They're not here 
1 82. 1 9  U.S.C.S. § 330 1 ( 1 993) (North American Free Trade Agreement). 
1 83.  World Trade Organization. 
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because they would rather be here. They would rather be home working. 
There are three or four of us that have said that already. It' s the truth. 





you rather be?" They'd rather be living their dreams m Mexico if they had 
the work. They are here to feed their families, that's why no matter how 
much money you put at the border, you can mine that goddamn border, 
they're going to continue coming if we don't solve the real push factors that 
are causing this .  
PROFESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG [MODERATOR] : What I'd like to 
do is, we have one additional contribution from Dean Demleitner, and then 
I'd like to offer the panelists an opportunity for some closing thoughts, 
briefly, because we are at the end of our time after this brief discussion. 
DEAN NORA V. DEMLEITNER: I'm guilty about taking our time, 
especially speaking after Professor Hing, but I think there is one point that I 
don't think has been covered by the media surprisingly enough, because I 
do believe that there is at least one group that has a true stake in this 
enforcement policy. A financial stake, and that's the Corrections 
Corporation of America. If it is accurate, the latest media reiEorts that they 
were actively involved in drafting the Arizona legislation. 1 4 And a few 
years ago, they were telling their shareholders in public documents--<lon't 
worry, even if the regular prison population were to decline, which is still 
hasn't, there i s  this large unmined population, undocumented immigrants, 
and even documented immigrants with a criminal conviction who we want 
to detain. And, if you are looking at their profit reports, they were 
absolutely correct. So, it's a great move strategically for them to support 
this type of legislation. So I am concerned that they' re frustrated, whether 
correct or not, that there is somebody w h o  is truly benefiting from these 
laws. 
PRO�ESSOR ANDREA ARMSTRONG (MODERATOR] : Okay, so should 
we start with Professor Diamond and then close with Professor Kusuda? 
PROFESSOR RAYMOND T. DIAMOND: I will return to a theme that 
I've mentione� at l�ast a couple of times, and simply ask this question: if on 
one lev�l, Anzona s real concerns are legitimate, that is, its concern with 
the pubhc fisc, the question is, "what should Arizona do about it?" 





�hat I will suggest is  that the debate we need to have about ummgrahon is a debate th t d k · · · a nee s to ta e a place m the pohttcal 
1 84. See Laura Sullivan Prison Econom · 
· H / D · · RADIO (Oct. 28, 2010 h 
'
·// 
ics e p rive Arizona Immigration law. NAT'L PUB. )
, ttp. www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 1 30833 74 1 &ps=cpr. 
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branches of government, at the federal level . I t ' s  a debate which has begun, 
and this conversation we're having today is part of it. 
I'm not inclined as to disagree with W i ll Rogers that "this country has 
come to feel the same when Congress is in session as when the baby gets 
hold of a hammer,"1 85 but I do believe that when Congress has access to 
information, we can at least ask it to make an intell igent decision. 
PROFESSOR INGRID EAGLY: I think the last question from Dean 
Demleitner is an important one. I do think that correctional policies and 
funding streams can potentially shape enforcement priorities. 
For example, there is a question, as Dean Demleitner highlights, as to 
whether the federal or state government will bear the incarceration costs for 
undocumented defendants. Since 1 996, we have had a federal program that 
reimburses localities for a portion of the correctional expenses incurred with 
holding certain undocumented persons for a minimum number of days. 
1 86 
So, there are built-in financial incentives for states. Namely, they can 
receive a reimbursement by incarcerating persons who qualify under the 
program for at least four days. 1 87 Whether these incentives play out in 
practice is an important area for future research. 
The Travis County, Texas data that we discussed earlier are also 
relevant to Dean Demleinter' s question. In Travis County, researchers 
found that enforcement patterns did in fact shift when Travis County 
. I d · " "CAP 
" 1 88 CAP . imp emente the so-called "Criminal Aben Program or . is 
a federally-funded program that involves localities in screening arrestees for 
immigration status . 1 89 As the study by the Warren Institute at Berkeley 
demonstrated, after the program was implemented in Irving, Texas, arrests 
f L . . 11 1 90 o atmos for petty offenses increased dramatlca y. 
PROFESSOR BILL ONG HING: I'm sorry if I sounded like l was 
picking on you. 
PROFESSOR HIROKO KUSUDA: l should have supplemented my 
earlier comment on this matter. I have to give a little more credit to the 
U.S. Congress in passing trafficking a bill,  Violence Against Women Act, 
1 85. LAURENCE J. PETER, PETER'S QUOTATIONS: IDEAS FOR OUR TIME 22 1 ( 1 979). 
1 86. 8 U.S.C. § 1 23 1  (i) (2006). 
1 87. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-05-337R, INFORMATION ON C
RI�:o�L 
ALIENS INCARCERATED JN FEDERAL AND STATE PRISONS AND LOCAL JAIL� 
1 3  ( }, 
http://www.govemor.state.az.us/documents/BorderSecurity/ICAIFSPLJ_Re
port_Apnl200S.pdf. 
1 88. Guttin, supra note 145.  
1 89. Id. 
1 90. Gardner & Kohli, supra note 143. 
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which gives relief to certain victims of trafficking and victin�s o f  �rime:
1 " 1  
Also there has been a recent Department o f  Justice 's effort i n  gomg after 
employers who benefit from trafficking and abus�ng �orkcrs, especially 
H2-B workers. 1 92 But these efforts have to substantial ly mcrcasc awarem:ss 
so that people will  understand what kind of cruel treatment c m� loyccs have 
been subjected to, and a relief the immigrant workers arc entitled. In our 
clinic we represent immigrant workers who were trafficked and abused. I 
totally agree with you, and both civil and criminal wrongdoings o n  the part 
of the employer should be punished. 
In closing, I think the most troublesome clement of state 
criminalization of immigrants, is the fact that immigrants arc not commonly 
savvy or "street smart." When they are arrested on the street, they con fess. 
or they make incriminating statements because they arc a fraid and they 
believe they are not entitled to an attorney to consult, they don 't know they 
don't have to say anything. So their statem ents come back and haunt them 
in the subsequent immigration proceedings, because such statements arc 
almost always considered admissible e vidence by most immigration judges. 
Moreover, noncitizens arc not entitled to appo inted counse l ;  there fore. they 
are placed in the most difficult situation .  Arresting imm igrants who arc not 
familiar with the American criminal j ustice system and i l legally obtaining 
information that incriminates them, without giving them a tool to defend 
themselves, is the most troublesome aspect of this attempt by local 
jurisdictions. I think that this problem c o ntinues unless or un til  one day 
Congress decides to appoint nonc itizcns counsel in immigration 
proceedings. I think that these u nrepresented people who represent 
themselves in the adversarial immigration court proceedings face a very 
difficult task, and that' s  the reason why we make a monthly visit to 
immigration detention center, to empower them in a li mited capacity that 
we have, to let them know these are your rights. But sometimes i t ' s  too late 
by the time we talk to them, so I sincerely hope that the state of Louisiana 
will not follow Arizo na ' s  lead. 
PR�F�S�O R  A�DREA �RMSTRONG [MODERATOR) : Wel l .  I hope 
that you 11 JOIIl m e  m thankmg Professor Medina and students with the 
Jou�al of Public  Interest Law, Loyola University New Orleans, its staff 
and its students who helped make this s ymposium possible. And last, but 
not least, our exp�rt panelists who brought all of their expertise to bear on 
some very, very difficult questions, so thank you very much. 
1 9 1 .  1 8 U.S.C.A. § 22 6 1  (West 20J I ). 
1 92. Florida Couple Pleadf Guilty t � 
· d L h ' · · 
F 
· o orce a or C onspiracy o/ 39 Filipino Guest Workers. ED. BUREAU OF INVESTJGA TION (Se t 1 7  20 \ 0) h · · · 
mb09 I 7 1  O.htm. 
p · ' ' ttp://miamJ.tb1.gov/dojprcssrcl/pressrel I O  
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EMPLOYMENT: Creates the Louisiana Taxpayer and Citizen Protection 
Act of2010 
AN ACT 
To enact Chapter 2 1  of Title 49 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 
1950, to be comprised of R.S .  49 : 1 3 1 1  through 1 323, relative to 
immigration; to provide for the determination of citizenship status for 
persons charged with certain crimes; to provide for verification of persons 
determined to be a foreign national;  to provide for time limitation for 
verification; to provide for notification to certain entities; to provide for 
rebuttable presumption that certain persons are a flight risk; to provide for 
participation in certain verification system; to provide for establishing 
certain discriminatory practice; to provide for requiring agencies and 
political subdivisions to verify lawful presence of persons applying for 
certain benefits; to provide for nondiscriminatory treatment; to require 
certain applicants to be verified through the Systematic Alien Verification 
for Entitlement Program; to require certain entities to monitor certain 
program; to require publication of annual report and certain 
recommendations; to require certain entities to submit a report of errors to 
certain agency; to require certain withholding of state income tax under 
certain circumstances; to provide relative to postsecondary education; to 
direct the Attorney General to negotiate terms of certain memorandum; to 
prohibit certain actions by government entities; to provide for establishing a 
Fraudulent Documents Identification Unit within the Department of Public 
Safety subject to availability of funding; to provide for a purpose; to 
provide for employment of sufficient employees; and to provide for related 
matters. 
Be it enacted by the Legislature of Louisiana: 
Section 1 .  Chapter 2 1  of Title 49 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 
1 950, comprised of R.S. 49: 1 3 1 1 through 1 323, is hereby enacted to read 
as follows: 
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CHAPTER 2 1 .  THE LOUISIANA TAXPAYER AND CITIZEN 
PROTECTION ACT OF 201 0  
PART I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
§ 1 3 1 1 .  Title 
This Chapter may be cited as the "Louisiana Taxpayer and Citizen 
Protection Act". 
§ 13 1 2. Legislative intent 
The state of  Louisiana finds that illegal immigration is  causing 
economic hardship and lawlessness in this state and that illegal immigration 
is encouraged when public agencies within this state provide public benefits 
without verifying immigration status. The state of Louisiana further finds 
that when illegal immigrants have been harbored and sheltered in this state 
and encouraged to reside in this state through the issuance o f  identification 
cards that are issued without verifying immigration status, these practices 
impede and obstruct the enforcement o f  federal immigration law, 
undermine the security of our borders, and impermissibly restrict the 
privileges and immunities of the citizens of Louisiana. Therefore, the 
people of the state of  Louisiana declare that it is a compel ling public 
interest of this state to discourage i llegal immigration by requiring all 
agencies within the state to fully c ooperate with federal immigration 
authorities in the enforcement of federal immigration laws. The state of 
Louisiana also finds that other measures are necessary to ensure the 
integrity of various governmental programs and services. 
§ 1313. Definitions 
As used in this Chapter the fol lowing terms shall have the definitions 
ascribed in this Chapter unless context c learly requires otherwise: 
( 1 )  "Public employer" means every department, agency, or 
instrumentality of the state or a p ol itical subdivision of the state. 
(2) "Subcontractor" means a subcontractor, contract employee, 
staffing agency, or any contractor regardless of its tier. 
(3) "Unauthorized alien" means an alien as defined in Section 
l 324a(h)(3) of Title 8 of the United States Code. 
20 1 1 ] Panel on Federalism in Practice 419  
PART I I .  PUB LIC BENEFITS 
§1314. Public benefits 
A. Except as provided in Subsection C of this Section or where 
exempted by federal law, each agency and each political 
subdivision of this state shall verify the lawful presence in the 
United States of any natural person fourteen years of age or older 
who has applied for state or local public benefits, as defined in 8 
U.S.C. 1 62 1 ,  or for federal public benefits, as defined in 8 U.S.C. 
1 6 1 1 ,  that is administered by an agency or a political subdivision 
of this state. 
B. The provisions of this Section shall be enforced without regard to 
race, religion, gender, ethnicity, or national origin. 
C. Verification of lawful presence under the provisions of this 
Section shall not be required: 
( 1 )  For any purpose for which lawful presence in the United 
States is not restricted by law, ordinance, or regulation. 
(2) For assistance for health care items and services that are 
necessary for the treatment of an emergency medical 
condition, as defined in 42 U. S.C. 1 396b(v)(3), of the alien 
involved and are not related to an organ transplant 
procedure. 
(3) For short-term, noncash, in-kind emergency disaster relief. 
(4) For public health assistance for immunizations with respect 
to diseases and for testing and treatment of symptoms of 
communicable diseases whether or not such symptoms are 
caused by a communicable disease. 
(5) For programs, services, or assistance such as soup kitchens, 
crisis counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter 
specified by the United States attorney general,  in the sole 
and unreviewable discretion of the United States attorney 
general after consultation with appropriate federal agencies 
and departments which: 
(a) 
(b) 
Deliver in-kind services at the community level, 
including through public or private nonprofit agencies. 
Do not condition the provision of assistance, the 
amount of assistance provided, or the cost of assistance 
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provided on the income or resources of the individual 
recipient. 
( c) Are necessary for the protection of life or safety. 
D. (1) Verification of lawful presence in the United State� by �he 
agency or political subdivision required to make s�ch ven ficat10n 
shall require that the applicant execute an affidavit under penalty 
of perjury that: 
(a) 
(b) 
He is a United States citizen. 
He is a qualified alien under the federal Immigration 
and Nationality Act and is lawfully present in the 
United States. 
(2) The agency or political subdivision providing the state or 
local public benefits shall provide notary public services at no 
cost to the applicant. 
E. For any applicant who has executed the affidavit described in 
Subparagraph ( 1  )(b) of Subsection D of this Section, eligibility 
for benefits shall be verified through the Systematic Alien 
Verification for Entitlements (SA VE) Program operated by the 
United States Department of  Homeland Security or an equivalent 
program designated by the United States Department of 
Homeland Security. Until such eligibility verification is made, the 
affidavit may be presumed to be  proof of lawful presence for the 
purposes of this Section. 
F. Any person who knowingly and willfully makes a false, 
fictitious, or fraudulent statement of representation in an affidavit 
executed pursuant to Subsection D of this Section shall be subject 
to criminal penalties applicable in this state for fraudulently 
obtaining public assistance program benefits. If the affidavit 
constitutes a false claim of U.S .  citizenship under 1 8  U.S.C.  9 1 1 ,  
a complaint shall be filed b y  the agency requiring the affidavit 
with the United States attorney general for the applicable district 
based upon the venue in which the affidavit was executed. 
G. Agencies or political subdivisions of this state may adopt 
variations to the requirements of the provisions o f  this Section 
which demonstrably improve the efficiency or reduce delay in the 
verification process, or to provide for adjudication of unique 
individual circumstances where the verification procedures in this 
Section would impose unusual hardship on a legal resident of 
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Louisiana. 
H. It shall be unlawful for any agency or a political subdivision of 
this state to provide any state, local, or federal benefit, as defined 
in 8 U.S.C. 1 62 1 ,  or 8 U.S.C. 1 6 1 1 ,  i n  violation of the provisions 
of this Section. 
I. Each state agency or department which administers any program 
of state or local public benefits shall provide an annual report to 
the governor, the president pro tempore of the Senate and the 
speaker of the House of Representatives with respect to its 
compliance with the provisions o f  this Section. Each agency or 
department shall monitor the Systematic Alien Verification for 
Entitlements Program for application verification errors and 
significant delays and shall provide an annual public report on 
such errors and significant delays and recommendations to ensure 
that the application of the Systematic Alien Verification of 
Entitlements Program is not erroneously denying benefits to legal 
residents of Louisiana. Errors shall also be reported to the United 
States Department of Homeland Security by each agency or 
department. 
PART III.  CRIMINAL 
§1315. Criminal: booking of arrested person, submission of booking 
information summary; citizenship, immigration status 
A. It is the duty o f  every peace officer making an arrest, or having an 
arrested person in his custody, promptly to conduct the person 
arrested to the nearest jail or police station and cause him to be 
booked. 
B. A person is booked by an entry, i n  a book kept for that purpose, 
showing his name and address, a l ist  of any property .
ta�en from 
him, the date and time o f  booking, and the subm1ss1on of a 
booking information summary as provided fo� in Para�raph ��) 
of this Section to the person making the entry m the pohce or Jail 
book. Every jail and police station shall k�ep a boo� for the 
listing of the above information as to ea�h pnsoner received. The 
book and booking information summanes shall always be open 
for public inspection. The person booked shall be imprison
ed 
unless he is released on bail. 
C. ( I )  At the time of booking, the peace officer causing the arres
ted 
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person to be booked shall deliver to the person at t�c j�il  or pol
_
icc 
station who accepts custody of the arrestee a book mg m fo�atton 
summary which shall include at least the following in formation: 
(a) The proper legal name o f  the arrestee, if known. 
(b) The charge or charges upon which the person was 
arrested and the name of the person making the arrest. 
( c) A short recitation o f  the facts or events which caused 
the defendant to be arrested. 
(d) The names of all other persons arrested as a result of 
the same events or facts . 
(2) If the peace officer presenting an arrestee for booking is 
unable to submit a complete booking information summary, 
he shall provide the person receiving custody of the arrestee 
a written statement or form, explaining why a complete 
booking information summary cannot be presented. 
D. ( 1 ) At the time of booking, the peace officer causing the arrested 
person to be booked shall attempt to determine the citizenship or 
immigration status of the person being booked. 
(2) If the arrested person is a foreign national, the peace officer 
shall make a reasonable effort to verify that the person has 
been lawfully admitted into the United States.  If the 
verification of lawful status cannot be determined from 
documents in the possession of the arrested person, the 
peace officer shall attempt to notify the United States 
Department of Homeland Security as soon as i s  practicable. 
E. The office of state police shall be responsible for investigating 
and apprehending persons or entities that participate in the 
manufacture, sale, or distribution of fraudulent documents used 
for identification purposes, including but not limited to fraudulent 
identification documents prepared for persons who are unlawfully 
residing within the state of Louisiana. The office of state police is 
hereby authorized to create a unit devoted to such investigations 
by rule promulgated in accordance with the Administrative 
Procedure Act. 
§1316. Unlawful h arboring, concealing, or sheltering of an alien 
A. It shall be unlawful for any person to harbor, conceal, or shelter 
from detection any alien i n  any place within the state of 
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Louisiana, including any building, when the offender has 
knowledge of the fact that the alien has entered or remained in the 
United States in violation o f  law and if either of the following 
occur: 
( l )  The offender has the intent of assisting the alien i n  eluding a 
federal, state, or local law enforcement agency, or the 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau. 
(2) The offender has the intent of assisting the alien i n  avoiding 
or escaping arrest, trial, conviction, or punishment. 
B. For the purposes of this Section, "alien" has the same meaning as 
defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
l 1 0 l (a)(3). 
C. Nothing in this Section shall b e  construed so as to prohibit or 
restrict the provision of any state or local public benefit described 
in 8 U.S.C. 1 62 1 (b), or regulated public health services provided 
by a private charity using private funds. 
D. ( 1 )  Whoever commits the crime of unlawfully harboring, 
concealing, or sheltering an alien o n  a first conviction shall be 
fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not 
more than six months, or both. 
(2) Whoever commits the crime of unlawfully harboring, 
concealing, or sheltering an alien on a second or subsequent 
conviction shall be fined not more than two thousand 
dollars, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. 
E. The following shall be affirmative d efenses to prosecution under 
this Section: 
( l )  The person was providing humanitarian aid as a �esi�nated 
representative of a nonprofit organization which ts tax 
exempt pursuant to Section 5 0 l (c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
(2) The person was the attorney or his d�signe�, o� su�h ot?er 
persons authorized to represent clients m immigrat10n 
matters pursuant to 8 C.F .R. 1 292. 1 ,  or their designe�, and 
who was assisting the alien and providing representation to 
the alien in the course and scope of the attorney ' s  or other 
authorized representative ' s  employment. 
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§1317. Unlawful transportation of a n  alien 
A. It shall be unlawful for any person to transport, move, or attempt 
to transport in the state of Louisiana any alien, knowing or in 
reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has entered or 
remained in the United States in violation of law, in furtherance 
of the illegal presence of the alien in the United States .  
B .  For the purposes of this Section, "alien" has the same meaning as 
defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U . S.C. 
l 1 0 l (a)(3) .  
C.  Nothing in this Section shall be c onstrued so as to prohibit or 
restrict the provision of any state or local public benefit described 
in 8 U.S.C.  1 62 1 (b), or regulated public health services provided 
by a private charity using private funds. 
D. ( 1 )  Whoever commits the crime of unlawfully transporting an 
alien on a first conviction shall be fined not more than one 
thousand dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or 
both. 
(2) Whoever commits the crime of unlawfully transporting an 
alien on a second or subsequent conviction shall be fined not 
more than two thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or 
without hard labor, for not more than one year, or both. 
E. The fo llowing shall be affirmative defenses to prosecution under 
this Section: 
( 1 )  The person was providing humanitarian aid a s  a designated 
representative of a nonprofit organization which is tax 
exempt pursuant to Section 50l (c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
(2) The person was the attorney or his designee, or such other 
persons authorized to represent clients in immigration 
matters �ursuant �o 8 C.F .R. 1 292. 1 ,  or other designee, 
representmg the ahen and who was transporting the alien in 
the course and scope of the attorney's or other authorized 
representative's employment. 
201 1 ]  Panel on Federalism in Practice 425 
PART IV. STATUS VERIFICATION 
§1318 Status Verification 
A. "Status Verification System" means an electronic system 
operated by the federal government, through which an authorized 
offiGial of an agency of the state of Louisiana or of a political 
subdivision therein may make an inquiry, by exercise of authority 
delegated pursuant to Section 1 3  73 of Title 8 of the United States 
Code, to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status 
of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any 
purpose authorized by Part V of this Chapter. The Status 
Verification System shall be deemed to include: 
( I )  The electronic verification o f  work authorization program of 
the Illegal Immigration Refonn and Immigration 
Responsibility Act of 1 996, P.L. 1 04-208, Division C, 
Section 403(a); 8 U.S .C. 1 324a, and operated by the United 
States Department of Homeland Security, known as the 
Basic P ilot Program. 
(2) Any equivalent federal program designated by the United 
States Department of Homeland Security or any other 
federal agency authorized to verify the work eligibi lity 
status o f  newly h ired employees, pursuant to the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1 986 (IRCA), 0.L. 
99-603 . 
(3) Any other independent, third-party system with an equal or 
higher degree of reliab i lity as the programs, systems, or 
processes described in this  Section. 
(4) The Social Security Number Verification Service, or such 
similar online verification process implemented by the 
United States Social Security Administration. 
B. The following entities may create, publish or otherwise 
manu facture an identification document, identification card, or 
identification certificate and may p ossess an engraved plate or 
other such device for the printing of such identification; provided, 
the name of the issuing entity shall be clearly printed upon the 
face of the identification: 
( I )  Businesses, companies, corporations, service organ i�ations 
and federal, state and local governmental agenc
ies for 
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employee identification which is designed to identify the 
bearer as an employee. 
(2) Businesses, companies, corporations and service 
organizations for customer identification which is designed 
to i dentify the bearer as a customer or member. 
(3) Federal, state, and local government agencies for purposes 
authorized or required by law or any legitlmate purpose 
consistent with the duties of such an agency, including, but 
not l imited to, voter identification cards, driver licenses, 
nondriver identification cards, passports, birth ccrti ficates 
and social security cards. 
(4) Any public school or state or private educational institution, 
as defined by Title 1 7  of  the Louisiana Statutes of 1 950, to 
identify the bearer as an administrator, faculty member, 
student or employee. 
(5) Any professional organization or labor union to identify the 
bearer as a member of the professional organization or labor 
um on. 
(6) Businesses, companies or corporations which manufacture 
medical-alert identification for the wearer thereof. 
C. All identification documents as provided for in Paragraph (3) and 
(4) of Subsection B of this Section shall be issued only to United 
States citizens, nationals and legal permanent resident aliens. 
D. The provisions of Subsection C of this Section shall not apply 
when an applicant presents, in person, valid documentary 
evidence of: 
( 1 )  A valid, unexpired immigrant or nonimmigrant visa status 
for admission into the United States. 
(2) A pending or approved application for asylum in the United 
States. 
(3) Admission into the United States in refugee status. 
(4) A pending or approved application for temporary protected 
status in the United States. 
(5) Approved deferred action status. 
(6) A pending application for adjustment of status to legal 
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permanent residence status or conditional resident status. 
Upon approval, the applicant may be issued an identification 
docume?t provided for in Paragraph (3) and (4) of 
S ubsection B of this Section. Such identification document 
shall be valid only during the period of time of the 
authorized stay of the appl icant in the United States or, if 
the�e is no definite end to the period of authorized stay, a 
penod of one ( I )  year. Any identification document issued 
pursuant to the provisions of this subsection shall clearly 
indicate that it is temporary and shall state the date that the 
identification document expires. Such identification 
document may be renewed only upon presentation of valid 
documentary evidence that the status by which the applicant 
qualified for the identification document has been extended 
by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
or other authorized agency of the United States Department 
of Homeland Security. 
E. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section shal l not apply to 
an identification document described in Paragraph ( 4) of 
Subsection B of this Section that is only valid for use on the 
campus or faci lity of that educational institution and includes a 
statement of such restricted val idity clearly and conspicuously 
printed upon the face of the identification document. 
F. Any driver license issued to a person who is not a United States 
citizen, national or legal permanent resident alien for which an 
application has been made for renewal, duplication or reissuance 
shall be presumed to have been i ssued in accordance with the 
provisions o f  S ubsection D o f  thi s  Section; provided that, at the 
time the application is made, the drivers license has not expired, 
or been cancelled, suspended or revoked. The requirements of 
Subsection D o f  this Section sha l l  apply, however, to a renewal, 
duplication or reissuance i f  the Department of Public Safety is 
notified b y  a local, state, or federal govemmen� a�en�y of 
information i n  the possession of the agency md1catmg a 
reasonable suspicion that the individual seeking _
such renew�!, 
duplication or reissuance is present in the . 
Umted States m 
violation o f  law. The provisions o f  this Subsect10n shal l not �pply 
to United States citizens, n ationals, or legal permanent resident 
aliens. 
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PART V. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS 
§1319. Public employers 
A. Every public employer shall register with and utilize a Status 
Verification System as described in  R.S. 49: 1 3 1 7  of this Chapter 
to verify the federal employment authorization status of all new 
employees. 
B. ( 1 )  After July 1, 20 l 0, no public employer shall enter into a 
contract for the physical performance of services within this state 
unless the contractor registers and participates in the Status 
Verification System to verify the work eligibility status of all new 
employees. 
(2) After July 1 ,  20 10, no contractor or subcontractor who 
enters into a contract with a public employer shall enter into 
such a contract or subcontract in connection with the 
physical performance of  services within this state unless the 
contractor or subcontractor registers and participates in the 
Status Verification System to verify information of all new 
employees. 
(3) The provisions of this Subsection shall not apply to any 
contracts entered into prior to the effective date of this 
Section even though such contracts may involve the physical 
performance of services within this state after July 1 ,  20 10 . 
C.  ( 1 )  It shall be a discriminatory practice for an employing entity to 
discharge an employee working in  Louisiana who is a United 
States citizen or permanent resident alien while retaining an 
employee who the employing entity knows, or reasonably should 
have known, is an unauthorized alien hired after July 1 ,  20 1 0, and 
who is  working in Louisiana in a job category that requires equal 
skill, effort, and responsibility, and which is performed under 
similar working conditions, as defined by 29 U.S.C. 206(d)( l ), as 
the job category held by the discharged employee . 
(2) An employing entity which, on the date of the discharge in 
question, was currently enrolled in and used a Status 
Verification System to verify the employment eligibility of 
its employees in Louisiana hired after July 1 ,  2 0 1 0, shall be 
exempt from liability, investigation, or suit arising from any 
action under this Section. 
(3) No cause of action for a violation of this Section shall arise 
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anywhere in Louisiana law but from the provisions of this 
subsection. 
PART VI.  CONTRACTORS 
§1320. Contractors; withholding of income tax on compensation paid to 
alien contractors 
A. In conformity with the Louisiana Taxpayer and Citizen Protection 
Act, a contracting entity shall b e  required to withhold individual 
income tax from the compensation paid to an individual 
independent contractor who is contracting for the performance of 
services in this state and who fai ls  to provide to the contracting 
entity documentation verifying the independent contractor's 
employment authorization, pursuant to the prohibition against the 
use of unauthorized alien labor through contracts set forth in 8 
U.S.C.  1 3 24(a)(4). The withholding of taxes shall apply to all 
compensation which exceeds the amount of compensation the 
contracting entity is required to report as income on United States 
Internal Revenue Service Form 1 099. The rate of withholding 
shall be the maximum marginal income tax rate as provided in 
R.S. 47:32(A)(3), without any exemptions. 
B. Any contracting entity failing to comply with the withholding 
requirements of this Section shall b ecome personally l iable for 
such tax in addition to any applicable interest, penalties and 
attorney fees. The tax, interest, penalties, and attorney fees shall 
be payable as provided in this Chapter, the amount of which may 
be determined, computed, and collected by any method generally 
provided for in this Chapter. However, the provisions of this 
Subsection shall not apply to a contracting entity which is exempt 
from federal withholding provis ions with respect to such 
individual independent contractor pursuant to a properly filed 
Internal Revenue Service Form 8233 or its equivalent. 
C. Nothing in this Section is intended to create, or sho.uld �e 
construed as creating, an employer-employee relat10nsh1p 
between a contracting entity and an individual independent 
contractor. 
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PART VII. HIGHER EDUCATION 
§1321. Higher education 
A. In addition to any other powers and duties authorized by Title 1 7  
of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1 950, each postsecondary 
system management board may adopt a policy that al lows a 
graduate of a public or approved nonpublic high school to qualify 
for that tuition and mandatory attendance fee amounts at an 
institution under its supervision and management shall be equal 
to tuition and mandatory attendance fee amounts applicable to 
students who are residents of Louisiana at such an institution i f  
the student resided in the state while attending classes at a public 
or approved nonpublic high school for at least two years prior to 
graduation. 
B. If the student cannot present to the institution valid 
documentation of United States nationality or an immigration 
status permitting study at the institution, he shall neverthe less be 
eligible for resident tuition and mandatory fee amounts if docs 
one of the following: 
(a) He provides to the institution a copy of a true and correct 
applic ation or petition filed with the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services to legalize his 
immigration status. 
(b) Files an affidavit with the institution stating that he will  fi le 
an application to legalize his immigration status at the 
earliest time he is eligible to do so, provided that such time 
is no later than the later of the fo llowing: 
(i) One year after the date on which the student enrolls for 
study at the institution. 
(ii) If there is no formal process to permit children of 
parents without lawful immigration status to apply for 
lawful status without risk of deportation, one year after 
the date the United States Citizenship and Immigration 
Services provides such a formal process. 
C. Any s�dent who completes the required criteria prescribed in 
Subsect10n(B) of the Section shall not be disqualified on the basis 
his immigration status from any scholarship or financial aid 
provided b y  the state. 
D. The provisions of this Section shall not impose any additional 
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conditions to maintain resident tuition status at a Louisiana public 
postsecondary education institution who was enrolled in a degree 
program and first received such resident tuition status at that 
institution prior to the 20 1 0-20 1 1 school year. 
PART VIII. GOVERNMENT AL ENTITIES 
§1322. Memorandum of understanding; local ordin ance prohibited; 
right of action 
A. The attorney general is authorized and directed to negotiate the 
terms of a Memorandum of Understanding between the state of 
Louisiana and the United States Department of Justice or the 
United States Department of Homeland Security, as provided by 
Section 1 3 57(g) of Title 8 of the United States Code, concerning 
the enforcement of federal immigration and customs laws, 
detention and removals, and investigations in the state of 
Louisiana. 
B. The Memorandum of Understanding negotiated pursuant to 
Subsection A of this Section shall be signed on behalf of this state 
by the attorney general and the governor or as otherwise required 
by the appropriate federal agency. 
C. No local government, whether acting through its governing body 
or by an initiative, referendum, or any other process, shall enact 
any ordinance or policy that limits or prohibits a law enforcement 
officer, local official, or local government employee from 
communicating or cooperating with federal offic ials with regard 
to the immigration status of any person within this state. 
D. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no government 
entity or o fficial within the State o f  Louisiana may proh ibit, or in 
any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending 
to, or receiving from, the United S tates Department o f  Homeland 
Security, i nformation regarding the citizenship or immigration 
status, lawful or unlawful, o f  any individual. 
E. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person or agency 
may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a p�blic e�ployce fr?m 
doing any o f  the following with respect to mformatlon regarding 
the immigration status, lawful o r  unlawful, of any individual: 
( 1 )  Sending such information to, o r  requesting o r  receiving such 
information from, the United States Department of 
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Homeland Security; 
(2) Maintaining such information; or 
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(3) Exchanging such information with any other federal, state. 
or local government entity. 
F. The provisions of this Section shall allow for a private right of 
action by any natural or legal person lawfully domici led in this 
state to file for a writ of mandamus to compel any non 
cooperating local or state governmental agency to comply with 
such reporting laws. 
PART IX. FRAUDULENT DOCUMENTS IDENTIFICATION UNIT 
§1323. Fraudulent documents identification 
Subject to the availability of funding, the Department of Public Safety 
shall establish a Fraudulent Documents Identification (FDI) Unit for the 
primary purpose of investigating and apprehending persons or entities that 
participate in the sale or distribution of fraudulent documents used for 
identification purposes. The unit shall additionally specialize in fraudulent 
identification documents created and prepared for persons who arc 
unlawfully residing within the state of Louisiana. The department shall 
employ sufficient employees to investigate and implement an FDI Unit. 
Section 2.  This Act shall become effective July l ,  20 10 . 
